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Shrinking semiconductor technologies come at the cost of higher susceptibility to hard-
ware faults that render the systems unreliable. Traditionally, reliability solutions are
aimed to protect equally and exhaustively all hardware parts of a system. This is in
order to maintain the illusion of a correctly operating hardware. Due to the increasing
error rates that induce higher reliability costs, this approach can no longer be sustain-
able.
It is a fact that hardware faults can be masked by various levels of fault-masking
effects. Therefore, not all hardware faults manifest as the same outcome on an ap-
plication’s execution. Motivated by this fact, we propose a shift to vulnerability-
driven unequal protection of a given structure (or same-level structures), where the
less-vulnerable parts of a structure are protected less than their more-vulnerable coun-
terparts.
For that purpose, in this thesis, we quantitatively investigate how the effect of
hardware-induced data corruptions on application behavior varies. We develop a port-
able software-implemented fault-injection (SWIFI) tool. On top of performing single-
bit fault injections to capture their effects on application behavior, our tool is also data-
level aware and tracks the corrupted data to obtain more of their characteristics. This
enables to analyze the effects of single-bit data corruptions in relation to the corrupted
data characteristics and the executing workload. After a set of extensive fault-injection
experiments on programs from the NAS Parallel Benchmarks suite, we obtain detailed
insight on how the vulnerability varies; among others, for different application data
types and for different bit locations within the data.
The results show that we can characterize the vulnerability of data based on their
high-level characteristics (e.g. usage type, size, user and memory space location).
Moreover, we conclude that application data are vulnerable in parts. All these show
that there is potential in exploiting the application behavior under data corruption. The
exhaustive equal protection can be avoided by safely shifting to vulnerability-driven
unequal protection within given structures. This can reduce the reliability overheads,
without a significant impact on the fault coverage. For that purpose, we demonstrate
the potential benefits of exploiting the varying vulnerability characteristics of applica-
tion data in the case of a data cache.
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Lay Summary
Computer applications are executing on computer hardware and manipulate data stored
in the computer hardware to perform computations and decisions according to their in-
tended functionality. Unfortunately the underlying computer hardware is becoming
increasingly unreliable due to a variety of physical effects. Such occurrences of hard-
ware faults may unpredictably change the values of the application data causing the
computer applications to potentially have unexpected behavior.
Interestingly though, the hardware faults do not affect the executing application
always in the same manner; there are many different effects that a hardware fault may
have on the behavior of an application. E.g., the application may stop operations, it
may complete but compute a wrong output, it may complete successfully, etc.
One of the goals of this thesis is to investigate how an application behaves under
the presence of hardware faults that corrupt the application data. For that purpose
we develop a framework that emulates hardware faults in application data during the
execution of an application and captures the resulting behavior of the application. After
performing extensive tests on a set of applications, among other things, we can observe
which application data are less likely than others to affect the application behavior if
corrupted.
Based on this vulnerability insight, we propose that we can exploit the application
data vulnerabilities to our benefit. As it is imperative that computing systems behave
correctly, it has been common to protect fully the computing systems against as many
hardware faults as possible. Such exhaustive protection though comes at the cost of
increased operating costs and decreased performance in the effort to maximize the
system’s reliability.
As we find out that not all application data are equally vulnerable, we propose
that it is not necessary to fully protect a computing system. Instead we can unequally
protect a system by decreasing the protection of the areas that are less vulnerable if a
hardware fault occurs there. That way we can reduce the protection overheads with a
minimum effect on the system’s reliability. As a mean to motivate such a design, we
demonstrate the magnitude of potential benefits of unequal protection in the case of
one hardware structure in particular, a data cache.
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Hardware reliability challenges have always been present in all parts of a system (logic,
interconnects, memory elements). Examples include wire-induced noise corrupting
data communicating over the interconnects, operating voltage/frequency scaling caus-
ing timing violations, gamma ray and alpha particle strikes flipping values in transis-
tors, ageing or manufacturing defects causing deterioration of chips and systems.
All such occurrences of anomalous physical conditions are called hardware faults
[45]. According to their duration, hardware faults can be classified into (a) transient
faults (soft errors or single event upsets) that occur only once and do not persist, (b)
permanent faults (hard faults) that occur at some point in time and persist from that
time onward and (c) intermittent faults that occur repeatedly but not continuously in
the same location.
Once a hardware fault occurs, it is upsetting logic values. Therefore, regardless
of the cause or the duration of hardware faults, all of them essentially lead to data
corruption. As data corruptions affect a system’s dependability, hardware faults must
be dealt with to ensure the hardware’s reliability.
Hardware faults are not a recent challenge and extensive research work is already
present to enable fault-tolerant features in a system. The purpose of fault-tolerant de-
sign is to improve dependability by enabling a system to perform its intended behavior
in the presence of a given number of faults [32].
As such, hardware faults need to be detected and corrected to ensure the correct
operation of a system. The approach to tolerate a fault depends on its type. Generally,
a set of up to four steps needs to be followed in order to tolerate a fault [45]: (1)
Error detection, where the system becomes aware of the presence of a fault, (2) Error
1
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recovery (error correction), where the system tries to mask the fault’s effect and set the
correct expected behavior, (3) Fault diagnosis, where the type and location of the fault
is identified (not for transient faults), and (4) Self repair, where the system is repaired
or reconfigured to avoid the diagnosed fault.
Each step requires a form of redundancy in terms of extra hardware and/or compu-
tations. Thus, reliability solutions always come with associated performance and cost
overheads in their effort to ensure the highest possible fault coverage.
As it is desirable for systems to maintain their expected functionality, even in the pres-
ence of faults, hardware reliability and correctness has become a design target equally
important to high performance and low cost. Due to the necessity of a correctly op-
erating infrastructure, especially on safety and mission critical systems, a common
approach has been to deal with hardware faults exclusively at the hardware level. In
that effort to ensure that the hardware operates correctly, all system components are
protected equally, exhaustively and transparently between the hardware/software stack
levels. Not unexpectedly, adding the necessary redundancy comes with an overhead
of extra operating costs and/or reduced performance. Such reliability-associated costs
are not an issue for the safety and mission critical systems.
As we move into deep submicron fabrication technologies the reliability challenges
start to appear in an ever-increasing rate [40]. As a result reliability concerns now arise
in commodity systems too. Once more the general consensus is to protect all system
components equally, exhaustively and transparently between the hardware/software
levels. This time though, due to the cost concerns in commodity systems, the various
proposed reliability mechanisms aim to maximize dependability under a minimum per-
formance/cost penalty. As such, most existing reliability approaches focus on reduc-
ing these reliability associated overheads by tinkering with the implementation details.
All these while ensuring that the hardware faults are hidden from the upper architec-
tural/software layers in order to still provide them with the behavior of a fault-free
hardware layer.
Unfortunately, due to the increasing error rates in successive process generations,
this black box approach cannot be maintained for much longer [9]. We are reaching
the point where it will be unsustainable to deal with all the faults at the hardware level
transparently. It will become prohibitively expensive, both in terms of power/area
cost and performance to tolerate all hardware faults and guarantee a fully protected
underlying hardware.
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All these lead to the general problem that motivated this thesis; increasing error
rates inducing unsustainable higher reliability costs, especially due to the equal and
exhaustive protection.
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 introduces
the natural fault-masking effects that are the motivation to our proposed solution to the
problem of unsustainably increasing reliability costs. Section 1.2 shifts the original
problem into the two new problems that this thesis intends to tackle in order to reduce
the reliability costs. Section 1.3 states the goals of this thesis and overviews our ap-
proach to achieve them. Section 1.4 states our main contributions. Finally, Section 1.5
concludes this chapter with an overview of this thesis.
1.1 Fault Masking
Interestingly, not all hardware faults end up manifesting as errors in the system’s be-
havior and the executing application’s behavior.
In fact, depending on the fault characteristics (location, type, timing, duration), the
executing workload and the underlying hardware, a hardware fault may get masked for
a variety of reasons by various levels of fault-masking effects [45]:
• Logic-level masking, where a hardware fault may get masked at logic gate level
before becoming an error, e.g., a 2-input AND gate’s output will not change if it
has a fault in one input and a zero in its other input.
• Architecture-level masking, where a hardware fault is not logically masked but
may never propagate to the architectural state, e.g., a hardware fault in memory
in the non-opcode bits of a NOP instruction or a hardware fault in the branch
predictor.
• Application-level masking, where a hardware fault is not architecturally masked
but may never propagate to the application’s output, e.g., a hardware fault in a
memory location that is never to be accessed again.
Once a fault does get masked by any fault-masking level, then the system and the
executing application behave as expected resulting into a correct application execu-
tion. If a hardware fault does not get masked and becomes an error, the effect on the
executing application varies and may be one of the following:
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• Application crash, where the not-masked hardware fault leads to an invalid op-
eration that causes the application to crash.
• Application stall, where the not-masked hardware fault causes the application to
wrongly wait for an event that will never occur or lead the application to enter
an infinite execution.
• Delayed correct execution, where the not-masked hardware fault does not cor-
rupt the application output but causes the computation to complete in a larger-
than-usual delay.
• Silent data corruption (SDC), where the not-masked hardware fault propagates
to the application output causing it to be different than the expected one. Con-
trary to all the previous execution upsets that are observable when they occur,
these cases where the output is wrong are unobservable execution upsets. They
can be identified only after application completion by comparing the effective
application output to the expected correct one. This non-observability of SDCs
make them the most severe case of possible execution outcomes under hardware
faults. There is also a special case of SDCs, that will not be considered by this
thesis, where the output corruption is masked at user level by not being perceived
as a wrong output, e.g., a single wrong pixel color in a frame of a video.
Fig. 1.1 visually depicts the possible fault-masking levels and the possible cor-
rupted execution outcomes. To summarize, depending on the fault characteristics
(location, type, timing, duration), the executing workload and the underlying hard-
ware, faults can either (a) get masked by various levels of fault-masking effects (logic-,
architectural-, application-level) and result in a correct execution with no visible effects
or (b) not get masked and result either in an observable execution upset (application
crash, stall or delay) or an unobservable output corruption (silent data corruption).
All these fault-masking effects have been widely documented by prior works, espe-
cially those that experimentally evaluate the dependability of fault-tolerant approaches.
In such works a breakdown of possible execution outcomes is usually presented and
the fault coverage is commonly measured as the percentage of the resulting SDCs.
Generally, the focus has always been on reducing the occurrence of SDCs because
they are the most severe ones. SDCs are the only execution outcome that is unde-
tectable online by any means and that does not provide any indication that something
happened out of the ordinary. All other corruption outcomes are observable and de-
1.2. Problem Statement 5
tectable by conventional methods, e.g., software-visible symptom-based fault detec-
tion [50, 27, 37, 13, 8] monitors for suspicious behaviors/symptoms, such as violating
likely program invariants, memory exceptions, cache misses, branch mispredictions,























Figure 1.1: A hardware fault possibly getting masked by different levels of fault-masking effects
and resulting into different possible corruption outcomes.
1.2 Problem Statement
As mentioned, reliability solutions face the problem of the unsustainably increasing
overhead costs as the hardware fault error rates increase, especially due to the tendency
to protect all hardware and software components equally and exhaustively.
Mainly motivated by the aforementioned fact that not all hardware faults manifest
as the same symptom in an application’s execution and can be masked by various levels
of fault-masking effects, this thesis proposes a solution to the unsustainable reliability
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costs. We propose that we can avoid protecting equally and exhaustively the under-
lying hardware. Instead we suggest a shift to vulnerability-driven unequal-protection
mechanisms, where the protection strength is assigned according to the error sensitiv-
ity of the components under protection. Our proposed shift to unequal protection will
be targeting a given structure or same-level structures.
Given that the end-to-end effect of a hardware fault on the application output is
what matters and, in particular, since only faults that lead to SDCs are what need to be
protected against, the area that needs to be protected strongly against faults can be re-
duced. This intuitively translates into reliability overhead reductions without affecting
the fault coverage. Alternatively, this points out that for the same overhead the fault
coverage can be increased and help sustain the increasing error rates. This is contrary
to most of existing fault-tolerance approaches that tend to be conservative and do not
leverage the inherent masking of hardware faults.
As what we propose is to assign protection to hardware/software components accord-
ing to their likelihood that a fault occurring there will cause an SDC to the final exe-
cution outcome, this thesis intends to tackle the problem of driving and implementing
vulnerability-driven reliability mechanisms.
This means that in order to solve the original problem of high unsustainable relia-
bility costs we shift the problem into:
• observing and characterizing the exact end-to-end effects of hardware faults on
application behavior, and
• exploiting the gained insight in a vulnerability-driven reliability mechanism to
reduce the reliability overheads in a given structure or same-level structures.
Generally we expect that useful insight can be gained by characterizing the ap-
plication behavior under hardware-induced data corruption conditions. In particular,
we expect that application behavior under unreliable conditions will vary and we in-
tend to exploit these variations to our benefit. Given the expected error sensitivity
variations, we will use this to avoid exhaustive equal protection and reduce the re-
liability overheads, without a significant reliability impact, by shifting to a class of
vulnerability-aware unequal-protection architectures, where less-vulnerable applica-
tion data are protected less against corruption than their more-vulnerable counterparts.
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1.3 Thesis Goals and Approach
Our proposed thesis goals revolve around investigating how the effect of hardware-
induced data corruptions on application behavior varies with the purpose of iden-
tifying exploitable insight in order to reduce the reliability costs by shifting into a
vulnerability-aware protection paradigm.
The goals of this thesis relate exactly to the twofold problem we intend to tackle.
Generally speaking, the research goal of this thesis is to answer the following ques-
tions: (1) Can application behavior under data corruption be characterized based on
the characteristics of the corrupted data (type, bit, location, etc.) and what data-level
error-sensitivity observations can be made? (2) How can this characterization insight
be exploited to drive the design of lower-cost vulnerability-aware unequally-protected
architectures?
To characterize the effects of hardware-induced data corruption on application
behavior based on the corrupted data characteristics and the executing work-
load, we use software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI). This is to model transient
fault data corruption in memory locations, during the operation of an application in a
unprotected system, and to capture the effect of the corruption on the execution.
As our focus is on gaining detailed error-sensitivity insight of application data
types, we develop a portable instrumentation-based SWIFI tool that operates at ap-
plication data level. Given an application binary, without need of its source code,
the SWIFI tool can finely control the location of the corruption in the application’s
memory address space without further intruding the application behavior. Once a fault
is injected at runtime, without need for binary file modifications per injection test, it
tracks the corrupted data to classify them according to their use by the application.
Meanwhile it monitors the execution’s state and outcome to report back many diag-
nostics regarding the corruption and the corruption outcome. Since we monitor the
full application behavior under data corruption until completion, we capture all higher
levels of fault-masking effects and all possible outcomes of a data corruption (ranging
from silent data corruption on one side of the spectrum to correct execution with no
visible effects on the other side).
SWIFI is an established method commonly used in the literature as it is a straight-
forward, fast and easy to deploy way to inject realistic faults in real systems, while
allowing for more detailed monitoring/reporting. It has been used mainly for system-
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level dependability assessment of reliability mechanisms [20, 42, 48, 7, 39] but usu-
ally without further elaboration on the vulnerabilities of individual hardware/software
structures. Other non fault-injection approaches do vulnerability estimation through
detailed modeling to analyze the behavior of only higher-level hardware structures [31,
46, 47]. Instead, we employ SWIFI in order to gain detailed error sensitivity insight at
a lower application data level.
The main value of our study stems from investigating data-level (down to bit-
level) vulnerability variations. As we can perform an extensive set of individual fault-
injection tests that report many diagnostic information, we can thoroughly character-
ize the data corruption effects on application behavior based on the characteristics of
the corrupted data; namely, among others, their location within the memory address
space, their size, their type as used by the application and, even, the exact bit location
of the corruption. This enables us to quantitatively investigate how the acuteness of the
effect of a hardware-induced data corruption on application varies. As a result we can
observe the actual varying vulnerability characteristics at application data-level, down
to identifying bit ranges within specific types of application data that if corrupted by
a single-event-upset are less prone to manifest as SDCs. This approach is more de-
tailed compared to existing studies, that also focus on vulnerability estimation, but
are limited due to investigating higher abstraction structures (e.g., specific hardware
structures [31, 46], code segments [13], instructions [6, 29]) or due to using limited
assumptions for estimating the vulnerabilities (e.g., characterizing individual memory
locations only by their liveliness attributes [29]). Moreover, as hardware functionality
is largely visible through software, the injected faults can emulate faults at various lev-
els of a system and not only at application data level. As such we can extrapolate the
insight to error sensitivity of instructions, memory address space and registers too.
After correlating the corruption characteristics to the reported corruption effects on the
application behavior, we gain statistical insight into the application data vulnerabili-
ties per tested workload. It is observed that there are vulnerability variations between
application data, even within bit ranges of specific application data types.
Given that the gained insight from the characterization study essentially estimates
data-level vulnerability factors for a given workload, it can be exploited by shift-
ing to vulnerability-driven unequally-protected architectures where the application
data are protected unequally according to their expected vulnerability. Moving down
into characterizing data-level vulnerabilities, instead of higher-level hardware/software
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structures, results into deeper and more exploitable insight by a variety of protection
schemes.
One promising way to exploit such insight is for reducing the cost of existing fault-
tolerant mechanisms that tend to protect everything equally. We argue that such a
shift is highly beneficial; the protection overhead can be reduced without a significant
impact on fault coverage, as we reduce the fault-protected surface by avoiding the
excessive full protection of the previously identified less-vulnerable application data.
This is contrary to traditional reliability approaches that either unnecessarily protect
all parts equally and exhaustively [16, 19, 52, 11] or offer unequal protection agnostic
to the actual distribution of likelihood of the application’s data to corrupt the execution
output [55, 22, 23].
Achieving these goals will allow to sustain the same reliability QoS as before but
for lower operating costs or higher performance. This can be translated also into sus-
taining a reliable operation of applications on the increasingly unreliable hardware.
Moreover, as our proposed class of vulnerability-aware fault-tolerant architectures
can have varying fault protection levels, it lends itself naturally to offer various degrees
of reliability QoS for trading off reliability against performance/cost. Considering that
our characterization study goes down to bit-level vulnerability estimation, the perfor-
mance/cost benefits can be maximized for an even smoother trading off against relia-
bility. This also enables graceful degrading architectures where for a given error rate
we may achieve better metrics than existing techniques and guarantee a minimum set
of executing functions.
Finally, vulnerability-aware unequal protection is orthogonal to the specifics of
fault-tolerant approaches. It may be applied to any kind of software- or hardware-level
fault tolerance method to reduce the total area under protection and, subsequently, their
reliability overhead.
As an instance to demonstrate the applicability and potential of exploiting the vary-
ing vulnerability characteristics of application data, we assume a data cache design that
can unequally protect its contents driven by our characterization insight and we observe
the trade-offs between the fault-protected surface reduction against the fault coverage.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we make the following main contributions:
• We establish an easy-to-deploy instrumentation-based SWIFI framework that
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can perform extensive tests on target binaries for a data-aware characterization
study of the exact data corruption effects on application behavior, where all pos-
sible levels of fault-masking effects are captured.
• After extensive experimental fault-injection tests, we observe different levels
of vulnerability variations. The most promising among them is the workload-
related vulnerability variation of application data of the NPB-serial benchmarks
based on their characteristics, along with the vulnerability variation within parts
of application data. For given application data characteristics, we identify clear
patterns of less-vulnerable bit ranges that if corrupted are less likely to cause
SDCs, e.g., up to 32 LSBs of floating-point data in the CG (Conjugate Gradient)
benchmark have each less than 1% probability to cause an SDC. The other ob-
served vulnerability variations are in areas such as the memory space, the register
file, individual instructions and the program space.
• We demonstrate the potential exploitability of our data-level characterization
findings in a generic fault-tolerant data cache running the NPB-serial bench-
marks. Assuming a vulnerability-aware unequal-protection mechanism we show
how much we can exploit the vulnerability characteristics of application data and
to what effect on the reliability QoS level, e.g., the fault-protected surface of a
64K data cache can be reduced by 41% with a less than 0.01% drop in the fault
coverage just by avoiding protection of the less-vulnerable bit ranges of floating-
point data in the EP (Embarrassingly Parallel) benchmark.
1.5 Thesis Overview
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2 we describe our SWIFI-based framework for enabling our data-aware
characterization study of the exact data corruption effects on application behavior. Ad-
ditional relevant supplementary material is detailed in Appendix A.
In Chapter 3 we present and analyze the characterization results after invoking our
SWIFI framework to extensively test the NAS Parallel Benchmarks. The application
behavior variation is observed in relation to different levels of corruption characteris-
tics; application data characteristics (usage type, size, location in memory space, bit
location corrupted, etc.), memory space characteristics, register-level characteristics
and instruction-level characteristics.
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In Chapter 4 we discuss the importance of our characterization findings and on
the ways they can be exploited for vulnerability-driven protection of a given struc-
ture or same-level structures. Then we demonstrate the potential of shifting to a class
of vulnerability-aware unequal-protection architectures by exploiting our insight in a
fault-tolerant data cache with two distinct levels of protection strength.
In Chapter 5 some background information on fault tolerance is discussed fol-
lowed by relevant prior works. The presented relevant studies generally relate to meth-
ods that investigate the varying vulnerabilities of hardware and software components,
methods that attempt to unequally protect a system and methods that trade-off reliabil-
ity against cost/performance.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarizing its approach and contri-




In this chapter we present our instrumentation-based software-implemented fault-inje-
ction (SWIFI) framework that can perform extensive data-level aware fault-injection
tests. Its end purpose is to capture the exact effects of hardware-induced data corrup-
tion on application behavior, mainly in relation to the corrupted data characteristics
and the executing workload.
To do so, we employ SWIFI to model transient single-bit fault in memory locations,
during application execution in an unprotected system, and to capture the corruption
effect on the execution. As we focus mainly on characterizing the effects of data
corruption at data level, we develop a portable instrumentation-based SWIFI tool that
is data-level aware. Given an application binary, without need of its source code, our
tool can finely control the location of the corruption in the application’s memory space
without further intruding the application behavior. Once a fault is injected at runtime,
without need for binary file modifications per test, on top of traditional fault-injection
approaches, it tracks the corrupted data to gather more information regarding them.
Meanwhile it keeps monitoring the execution to report back more diagnostics relating
to the corruption characteristics and the corruption outcome.
We opted to perform the characterization study through fault injection testing, in-
stead of modeling-based methods. Fault injection is a straightforward technique that
allows us to quickly set a toolchain to capture all possible end-to-end effects of data
corruption down to bit-level granularity, in real applications in real systems. If we were
to use analytical techniques, the propagation of every bit of every used data would have
to be modeled through a detailed hardware/software data flow analysis. Then, to obtain
the desired vulnerability characteristics, a slow detailed microarchitectural simulation
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of the tested application would have to be performed. Despite the time effort, this
analytical approach would still not be able to capture all the detailed corruption char-
acteristics and effects, as we intend.
Moreover, due to implementing the SWIFI framework using binary instrumenta-
tion in particular, the close monitoring of the application execution status is possible
without requiring all of the above. Dynamic instrumentation is an easy to deploy,
portable and efficient way to alter and monitor an application’s execution. On top of
modeling the desired corruption and capturing the exact execution outcome of real ap-
plications in real systems, fault injection by instrumentation also allows us to finely
control the location of corruption, to closely observe the execution and to capture even
finer details of the corruption characteristics and the corruption effects.
In the rest of this chapter, first, we present an overview of our framework in Section 2.1.
Then, to show how we can capture all the desired properties of our experiments, in
Section 2.2 we elaborate on the details of the individual single-fault injection process,
focusing on the chosen injected fault model and the data-tracking capabilities of the
implemented tool.
2.1 Framework Overview
Our proposed SWIFI framework (Fig. 2.1) operates as follows on a given application-
under-test to characterize its behavior under data corruption:
• First, a golden run of the target binary is profiled, without introducing data cor-
ruption, to obtain (a) its expected correct output (for SDC detection), (b) its nor-
mal execution time when under instrumentation by our tool (for delayed/stalled
execution detection) and (c) its total number of memory load accesses (for de-
ciding the sample rate to drive the tests uniformly over the test space).
• Then a single-fault injection tool is repeatedly invoked on a clean instance of the
target application, each time corrupting a different memory load operation. In
every test, the application-under-test is re-executed, a bit-flip is injected at a ran-
dom bit of a different specified memory load access and the rest of the execution
is closely monitored to capture/report the details of the corrupted data character-
istics and of the exact corruption effects. Given a sample rate, we drive the tests
uniformly over the test space of all possible memory locations and times.
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Figure 2.1: Our proposed framework that captures an application’s behavior under data cor-
ruption through extensive multiple single-fault injection experiments.
• Finally, once all tests complete, the extensive reported execution results are ag-
gregated to relate the corruption outcome to the corrupted data characteristics
(Chapter 3).
Once we set up the framework, it will run extensive fault injection tests over given
applications. Due to the volume of our experiments and the detailed reported diagnos-
tics, after aggregating our results and studying them, we will be able to confidently
relate in many ways the corruption attributes and the resulting corruption effect on the
application. Among the gained insight, we expect to be able to elaborate on the vary-
ing vulnerability factors of application data depending on their characteristics, down
to even identifying different vulnerability levels within bit ranges of application data.
2.2 Single-Fault Injection Tool
At the heart of our framework is the single-fault injection tool that operates following
the established fault injection methodology. In each test once the fault trigger con-
dition is reached, a fault injection is performed according to the chosen fault model
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and the rest of the execution is monitored to report the exact end-to-end effect of the
corruption. Since we opted for SWIFI these operations are performed using special
software to emulate the behavior of expected hardware faults during the application
operation only (and not the kernel).
To briefly outline the operation of the single-fault injection tool, it performs and
monitors the fault injection tests by dynamic binary instrumentation of the application-
under-test. In each test just before a specified memory load access a random bit of the
accessed data is flipped to emulate a single-bit transient fault in the particular memory
location. Then the execution is monitored and, on top of usual SWIFI approaches, the
corrupted data are tracked in order to report more detailed corruption characteristics
(Table 2.1) and corruption effects (Table 2.2).
2.2.1 Fault Trigger
First, the single-fault injection tool starts by instrumenting the application-under-test
until the execution reaches the specified memory load access to be corrupted. The
memory load access to be corrupted will be chosen uniformly out of the total memory
load accesses of the tested workload.
The specified memory load access acts as both a spatial and a temporal fault trig-
ger to invoke the injection routine just before the load operation. Instead of corrupting
random memory locations in the whole address space at random times, using the mem-
ory load access as a fault trigger captures all possible times that a transient fault could
occur and all possible live memory locations that could get corrupted by a transient
fault. Thus it simplifies driving where/when to inject a fault as it narrows down to
selecting a memory load access, without having to rely on external events. Also its
inject-before-load policy reduces the testing space by avoiding the unnecessary testing
of dead memory locations.
2.2.2 Fault Injection and Fault Model
Once the instrumentation code detects that the fault trigger condition has been reached,
the fault-injection routine is invoked in a manner similar to a software trap. Then,
complying to our fault model, it injects a random bit-flip in the accessed data just
before they are accessed.
The chosen injected fault model emulates single-bit transient faults in memory
locations by randomly flipping a bit of the accessed data just before they are accessed
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by a memory load operation. The bit-flip is performed by storing the corrupted value to
the same memory location without further intruding the application’s original behavior.
This is to force the execution to behave as if a different value was already there and
avoid activating any reliability mechanisms of the system that would skew our intended
vulnerability insight.
Software-injected high-level faults model lower-level hardware-induced data cor-
ruption to make the system behave as if a hardware fault was present in order to mon-
itor the application behavior. Therefore, it is important in fault-injection testing for
dependability assessment to choose fault models that closely resemble the naturally
occurring hardware faults. Given that we focus on error sensitivity of application data,
the chosen fault model suffices for our purposes to capture the application behavior
under corrupted application data without a need for precise realistic hardware fault
models. Plus, due to the instrumentation-based SWIFI the fault model does not need
to be adapted per target system but only to have the necessary high-level characteristics
(type, duration, location) required by our application data level investigation.
In particular, we chose a bit-flip fault type instead of stuck-at-zero or stuck-at-one
to ensure that application data will always be corrupted at every injection test.
Moreover, the inject-before-load policy enforces emulation of transient faults as the
injected corruption will not persist after the corrupted location is overwritten. Model-
ing transient fault duration fits better our purposes as they affect only a single memory
object. On the contrary, permanent/intermittent (or multi-bit) faults in memory loca-
tions, besides being harder to emulate in software, corrupt different data over time (or
multiple bits). In that case it would be indistinguishable which corrupted data (or bits)
are responsible for the reported outcome.
Finally, the injected fault location is in main memory and it suffices for our data-
aware error sensitivity investigation. Although we inject fault at main memory lo-
cations, our chosen fault model is not limited to emulating hardware faults only in
memory. Depending on the system and how the fault is propagated, it may translate to
emulating faulty behavior in other locations too, such as the register and the cache lo-
cation where the corrupted value is loaded, or faulty behavior of communication wires
and CPU instructions that use the corrupted value.
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Figure 2.2: Decision tree used by the single-fault injection tool to classify the corrupted appli-
cation data according to their use by the application.
2.2.3 Monitoring, Data Tracking and Reporting
Once the fault has been injected the rest of the application execution is still instru-
mented and analyzed to monitor and report the effects of the data corruption. As the
instrumentation and analysis are transparent to the original binary behavior, the fault-
injection software does not intrude the application space/behavior and guarantees the
non-intrusiveness of the SWIFI tool.
Due to the chosen fault trigger, fault model and instrumentation-based injection
we can perform data-level aware fault injection and data-aware characterization of
corruption effects. Once the memory location is corrupted and then loaded, we can
track it as an application variable to get its detailed usage characteristics and relate
them to the outcome to capture the varying vulnerabilities of application data.
More precisely, at the moment of the fault injection, the tool tries to finely identify
as many characteristics of the corrupted data as possible (Table 2.1). Attributes such
as their location in the memory address space (global, heap or stack), size and user
(system or user data) can be identified immediately.
Classifying the type of the corrupted data according to their use by the application
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(Fig. 2.2) can be either immediate (e.g., floating-point data, instruction pointer, etc.) or
it may require tracking the data through the execution until a first meaningful use (e.g.,
to determine if they are used for addressing memory or not).
To elaborate, at fault injection which always happens just before a memory load op-
eration, we can identify the first register (R) where the corrupted data (D’) are stored.
If it is a floating-point register, the instruction counter or a segment/stack pointer reg-
ister, we can classify immediately the corrupted data as floating-point (FP), instruction
pointer (IP) or memory addressing data (PTR) respectively. Otherwise, we check if the
original uncorrupted data (D) hold a value within the address ranges of the application
binary image and, if they do, we identify them as memory addressing data (PTR).
If the data usage type cannot be determined immediately, data tracking and close
monitoring of the execution are used to determine their usage. The corrupted (and
the uncorrupted) value is checked against all subsequent accessed effective memory
addresses to check if the corrupted data are used for memory addressing (PTRMR).
Meanwhile, for a specified instruction window, we use dynamic taint analysis [56]
to track the data propagation from the first register (R) to hold the corrupted data and
from the corrupted memory location (M). We model our problem as a dynamic taint
analysis problem where the taint sources are the register R and the bytes in M. After
every instruction, we track accordingly the taint propagation to other registers and
memory locations.
To do so, for every executed instruction, we obtain a list of the input/output registers
and input/output memory locations accessed by the instruction and:
• If the instruction clears an output register (e.g., sub R1, R1, R1), then the out-
put register gets untainted in case it was tainted already.
• If the instruction outputs to registers/memory locations:
– If any of the input registers/memory locations is tainted, then all output
registers/memory locations must get tainted.
– Otherwise, if all of the input registers/memory locations are untainted, then
all output registers/memory locations must get untainted.
• If the instruction does not output to any register/memory location:
– No taint propagation for this instruction.
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Table 2.1: Reported corruption characteristics
Characteristics of corrupted data
Injected bit-flip location
Memory address of corrupted data
Memory space location global, heap or stack
Size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 bytes
User System library data or application-space (user) data
Usage type FP: floating-point data (immediate classification)
IP: instruction pointer (immediate classification)
PTR: memory addressing data (immediate classification)
PTRMR: memory addressing data (classification by checking subsequent accessed
memory addresses)
PTRTP: memory addressing data (classification by data tracking until first use as
memory addressing data within an instruction window)
INT: integer data (if none of the above)
Other corruption characteristics
Corrupted memory load access number
First register to store the corrupted data
Corrupted instruction Instruction pointer, opcode and time at corruption
First use of corrupted data Instruction pointer, opcode and time at first use of first register to store the corrupted
data
If usage type identified as memory addressing data (PTRMR or PTRTP)
Time until first use as memory addressing data
Taint propagation of corrupted data Number (and total cumulative number) of registers and memory bytes where the
corrupted data have propagated through until detection as memory addressing data.
This tracking continues until a tainted register (in other words, a register whose
contents have been affected by the original corruption) is used for computing a memory
address (when the tainted register is used as a base or index register in a memory
operation). If this happens within the specified instruction window, then the original
corrupted data are reported as memory addressing data (PTRTP). The requirement to
perform dynamic taint analysis for a specified instruction window is to avoid taint
explosion, where the taint from register R would end up propagating to all registers
and would cause the false positive reporting of the original corrupted data as PTRTP.
Apart from reaching the end of the tracking instruction window, other reasons that
stop the tracking are: (a) an event causing the execution to stop (i.e., the application
finishes or crashes), and (b) the detection of the corrupted data as PTRMR in the mean-
time. Finally, if by the end of the execution the usage type is still unclassified, then the
corrupted data are reported as integer data (INT).
Table 2.1 summarizes all the reported corruption characteristics. Most relate to the
characteristics of the corrupted data (memory address, corrupted bit location, memory
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Table 2.2: Reported corruption effects
Corruption effects
Total number of executed instructions
Execution outcome Correct output
Delayed correct output
when the total execution time is a set amount of times more than the normal uncorrupted
execution time
Application crash
reported along with the crash details, the instruction’s opcode that caused the crash and
the time in instructions from the corruption until the crash
Application stall
due to excessive total executed instructions (or excessive total execution time), as dictated
by specified stall-time ratios, indicating that the corruption caused an infinite execution
(or the application to wait)
Silent data corruption (SDC)
wrong output
space location, size, user and usage type). Moreover, due to the close monitoring and
data tracking we can take note of other corruption details, such as the first register to
store the corrupted data, the first instruction to use the corrupted data, the time until first
use of the corrupted data, the time until first use as memory addressing data, how much
the corruption propagated in the register file and memory (taint propagation spread in
terms of tainted registers and memory bytes), etc. It will later be shown how such
information can be used to extrapolate the application data error sensitivity insight to
other functional units’ error sensitivity (such as the register file) or to instruction-level
error sensitivity.
After the injection, apart from possibly tracking the corrupted data to determine their
usage type, the tool keeps monitoring closely the execution to capture all possible exact
corruption effects (Table 2.2). The execution time is monitored to detect application
stalls or delayed executions, the output is checked for correctness or SDCs and fatal
signals are caught to identify crashes.
Once the execution completes (or stops due to a crash or a detected stall), the tool
reports back all the captured details relating to the corruption characteristics (Table 2.1)
and to the observed corruption effects (Table 2.2) for the performed single-fault injec-
tion test.1
1For details regarding the format and the meaning of the reported information, along with more
details on the way the reported information was captured, see Appendix A.
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2.2.4 Benefits of Binary Instrumentation
It has been mentioned why fault injection is more fitting to our purposes, compared to
modeling or simulation approaches, as it has the benefit of being a fast way to capture
the exact end-to-end effects of data-corruption.
Moreover the ease of performing fault-injection experiments is further ensured by
opting for software-implemented fault-injection (SWIFI), instead of hardware-imple-
mented, that on top of that is a dynamic binary instrumentation based implementation.
SWIFI, compared to hardware-implemented fault injection, is more flexible, easier to
operate, control and monitor the execution, while being more portable and not requir-
ing special purpose hardware.
Especially due to the use of dynamic binary instrumentation for performing the
SWIFI tests, our characterization framework inherits all the benefits of using instru-
mentation. Dynamic instrumentation is an easy to deploy, portable and efficient way
to alter and closely monitor an application’s execution. Furthermore, it helps to imple-
ment all our desired properties of the experiments; it assists our intended data tracking
and detailed execution monitoring, it allows to finely control the corruption location, to
closely observe the execution and to capture the intended finer details of the corruption
characteristics and the corruption effects (as shown in Tables 2.1-2.2).
All these are achieved without intruding the original behavior of the tested appli-
cation. As the instrumentation code is contained from the original binary, the injection
and monitoring routines are transparent to the executing target application and do not
interact with it, apart from injecting the corruption, and do not interfere with the ob-
served application behavior under corruption.
Moreover, as dynamic binary instrumentation allows for a runtime injection imple-
mentation, any application can be tested without need for its source code; as long as a
native executable binary file is available, it can be fault injected. There is no need for
recompilation of the source code or for pre-runtime modification of the original binary
to accommodate each different test. The injection can be performed without requir-
ing special architectural features or special hardware to trigger the injection routine or
test-specific software/hardware traps.
As the target application does not require modification, many tests can be per-
formed without changing the binary to support specific injections every time. As this
enables the automatic injection in the test space, with no manual effort required, a
larger number of tests can be performed automatically at a lower effort cost.
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2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our instrumentation-based software-implemented fault-
injection (SWIFI) framework. It utilizes a single-fault injection tool that is repeatedly
invoked to inject single-bit transient faults at uniformly chosen memory load accesses
during separate runs of the application-under-test. Its purpose is to monitor the appli-
cation behavior under data corruption, while tracking the corrupted application data, to
report detailed diagnostics regarding the corruption characteristics and the corruption
effects.
To summarize the key attributes of our approach, contrary to existing approaches,
our framework enables to thoroughly quantify the varying effects of hardware-induced
data corruption on application behavior. This is by observing the results of exten-
sive experiments (to uniformly test data among the testing space and to confidently
elaborate on the relation between the corruption location attributes and its effect) that
are fault-injection-based (to capture all levels of fault-masking effects and all possible
end-to-end exact corruption effects). Moreover, the experiments are finely controlled
(to control the exact location of the injected corruption), closely monitored (to report a
variety of detailed diagnostic information regarding the corrupted data characteristics
and the corruption effect) and data-level aware (to enable our intended novel finer-
grained characterization of data corruption effects).
In the next chapter, we employ our framework to extensively test a set of bench-
mark applications and then aggregate all the detailed reported results in order to char-





In this chapter, first we describe how we setup our experimental framework to repeat-
edly test a set of benchmark applications (NPB-serial). Then, after performing our
extensive tests and aggregating all the detailed reported results, we discuss our find-
ings towards characterizing the exact effects of data corruption on application behavior
based on the attributes of the corruption.
As we will observe how application behavior varies under data corruption, we will
be able to elaborate on the varying vulnerability characteristics of application data de-
pending on their characteristics and the executing workload. What we consider as vul-
nerability of application data is the probability of resulting into a silent data corruption
(SDC) if corrupted during the execution of the application.
Although our fault-injection tests corrupt memory location data specifically, our
characterization analysis is not limited to investigating application data vulnerabilities
only. Due to the nature of the reported corruption characteristics, we can investigate
vulnerabilities of other hardware/software areas. This is contrary to existing studies
that were limited to estimating the vulnerabilities of only the higher specific abstrac-
tion structures under consideration (e.g., specific hardware structures [31, 46], code
segments [13], instructions [6, 29]).
In particular, first, the workload-related vulnerability variation is observed. Then it
is followed by the data-related variation based on data level characteristics, such as
corrupted data type, size, bit location corrupted, etc. Finally, using the remaining
corruption characteristics being reported by our framework, some other interesting
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vulnerability variations are discussed to elaborate on the error sensitivity of other areas,
such as the memory space, the register file, individual instructions, the program space,
etc.
Generally, our purpose is to gain exploitable insight and to potentially identify
areas with lower vulnerabilities. As we propose that the error sensitivity insight can
be used to drive the design of lower-cost vulnerability-aware reliability mechanisms,
where protection is assigned according to the protected part’s vulnerability to cause an
SDC, we will focus on identifying areas with lower probability to result into an SDC.
3.1 Experimental Setup
The proposed SWIFI framework was implemented as a set of scripts and dynamic
binary instrumentation Pin tools [28]. The full set of the ten workloads of the NAS
Parallel Benchmarks [10] (64-bit, NPB-serial1 version 3.3.1, input class size S, gcc
4.4.6 -o3, Linux kernel 2.6.32) was extensively tested by our framework on a x86-64
computer cluster [33].
As it usually holds for all experimental evaluation setups, our results too are con-
ditional to the chosen experimental setting. All attributes of the hardware/software
configuration (e.g. chosen benchmarks, input sets/size, compiler parameters, hardware
parameters) affect the observations to be made. In this instance, the vulnerability vari-
ations will be observed for the aforementioned setup of benchmarks, input size and
hardware architecture. Nevertheless, here we explain the reasoning behind our choices
and how these could affect the observed results.
For the purpose of our vulnerability investigation we tested the NPB applications.
The NAS Parallel Benchmarks (NPB) are a small set of programs designed to help
evaluate the performance of parallel supercomputers [10]. NPB perform highly-iterative
scientific computations over test input data generated within each benchmark run.
Example computations include fast Fourier transformation (FT), integer sorting (IS),
eigenvalue estimation (CG), Heat equation solving (UA), etc. NPB support different
input class sizes and have generally little I/O. NPB are not strongly dependent to the
generated input resulting into similar execution times for different same-size inputs.
One of the main reasons behind testing the NPB applications was their data-intensive
1We tested only the serial versions of NPB as our fault injection tool does not support parallel
applications.
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scientific nature. As the main focus of this study was to identify the vulnerabilities of
application data, such workloads were a good fit to focus on testing the vulnerabili-
ties of data types. One other inadvertent benefit of testing the NPB applications was
their reliance on floating-point arithmetic. Due to their FP-heavy nature, FP data were
extensively tested and showed similar behavior across the different programs. This
established that this observed behavior is fundamental and should hold for other con-
figurations of floating-point intensive codes.
On the other hand the selected benchmarks posed some limitations exactly due
to their nature. As they heavily rely on iterative computations, there are more op-
portunities for faults to get masked by application-level masking effects making the
benchmarks inherently more resilient. Nevertheless, the intention of our study has
been to capture all masking effects. As a side effect of the iterative nature of the tested
programs, a more intensive testing of the more-frequent data became possible and that
further increased the confidence of the results to solidify the observed behavior. This
held more true especially in regards with the data types that showed consistent behavior
across benchmarks.
Finally, another initial reason behind testing the NPB applications was their parallel
nature that would enable also to test the vulnerability of data controlling the parallel
execution. Alas, only the serial versions of NPB were tested as supporting parallel
applications would require significant modifications of the fault injection tool. As
expected, this limits the gained insight by not reporting an extra type of application
data, those that control the parallel execution. Besides that, the rest insight is expected
to hold irrespective of the parallelism or not of the tested application.
Another parameter that affects the results is the input class size and the input data
values. There are different input class sizes that can be chosen to execute the NPB
applications. We would not expect larger input sizes or different inputs to have a
significantly changed vulnerability behavior for a given program, for the case of the
tested applications. The NPB programs are highly iterative and would behave similarly.
A larger input class would only increase the test space and increase the time to perform
the experiments.
Therefore, we opted for the smallest input class size (input class size S). This not
only reduced the execution time per benchmark but also the size of the total test space.
Although this resulted into less tests performed for a given sampling rate, the number
of total tests performed was still significant enough. Moreover, due to the uniform
distribution of the tests, memory locations may be tested multiple times over different
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runs increasing the confidence of our results. As before, we wouldn’t expect larger in-
put sizes to have a significantly changed vulnerability behavior for a given program of
the tested applications, especially due to the dependance of the observed vulnerability
variations mostly on the type of the tested data.
Similarly, we don’t expect significant variations for different input values. As NPB
target the performance evaluation of parallel systems, the generated inputs try to gen-
erate an equal workload. For that reason, although we ensured that the generated input
was the same in every different run of the benchmarks, we expect that the observed
vulnerability patterns will still hold for other input values. More so because our most
interesting observations are explained due to the nature of the corrupted data types.
What we expect would differ in relation to the input values is the exact intensity of the
observed vulnerability levels.
To conclude, the observed vulnerability variations depend on the chosen experi-
mental setup. Despite the limitations, we expect that our main observations, that will
be discussed throughout the rest of this chapter, can still hold for different setups.
As it will be shown later in this chapter, our two main observations relate to (a) the
per-bit data level vulnerability behavior of application data and (b) the potential of
a per-application vulnerability characterization to generate useful insight at different
observation levels. Although the exact results are conditional to this setting and all
decisions made would affect the exact observed vulnerability variations, these choices
though do not invalidate our observations. Both observations will still hold for differ-
ent setups because the former (a) reflects a fundamental behavior of application data
types and because the later (b) inherently asks for a characterization testing under a
given experimental setup before obtaining/exploiting the results.
Before commencing with the individual fault injection tests, the benchmarks were pro-
filed (Table 3.1) to obtain their total memory load accesses and their normal uncor-
rupted execution time under instrumentation. As the number of total memory load
accesses captures all possible memory locations and times to inject a fault (not includ-
ing all the possible different bits where the fault could be injected within a memory
location), it indicates the size of our testing space. Given that in the profiled bench-
marks the total memory loads ranged from 4.7 million to 914.9 million, summing up to
a cumulative total of 2.28 billion, testing every bit of every memory load access would
be impractical and unreasonable. Nevertheless, such an exhaustive testing would pro-
vide with the highest possible degree of confidence at the extreme cost of testing time.
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Table 3.1: Profiling and sampling information for each tested benchmark
NPB-SERIAL 3.3.1, INPUT CLASS S
Bench- Total memory Execution Sample Memory loads Test space
mark loads (M) time (sec) rate tested (K) coverage (%)
BT 187.5 20.7 1/234 801.6 0.43
CG 111.9 22.7 1/153 731.3 0.65
DC 33.1 21.9 1/43 769.9 2.33
EP 778.2 52.3 1/2461 316.2 0.04
FT 112.0 31.9 1/216 518.5 0.46
IS 4.7 3.4 1/5 959.3 20.00
LU 62.9 16.5 1/62 1015.6 1.61
MG 10.6 13.7 1/8 1335.0 12.50
SP 66.9 15.3 1/62 1079.3 1.61
UA 914.9 53.3 1/2947 310.4 0.03
Total 2283.1 - - 7837.6 0.34
Instead we set sample rates per benchmark to uniformly distribute our fault injec-
tion tests over the test space of possible memory load accesses to corrupt. To further
ensure the uniform distribution of the tested injected corruptions, in every test the bit-
flip was randomly injected within the tested data to ensure an equal probability of
testing every bit.
An implication of introducing the sample rate, that is using the memory load access
to uniformly distribute the tests over the test space, is that more-frequently accessed
data may be tested more times than less-frequently accessed data. Given that each test
is independent and in every test a different bit is corrupted, this works to our benefit to
further ensure the confidence of our vulnerability results when considering a specific
combination of application data types. On the other hand, one limitation of sampling
based on load accesses is that some accessed data may never be tested. This would
not affect our final observation as these are data that are likely not to stay live for long
execution periods and thus are less likely to get corrupted and affect the execution. In
any case though, for safety reasons, they can still be assumed as critical data even if
they haven’t be tested.
Table 3.1 shows the chosen sample rates that ranged from 1/5 to 1/2947 to uni-
formly test each benchmark. They were decided based on the number of memory
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loads and normal execution time per benchmark, so that each benchmark is tested in
approximately the same total time on the available computer cluster, where the em-
barrassingly parallel nature of the tests was exploited for a faster completion of the
experiments (less than a week). The test space sampling brought the total number
of performed fault injection tests to 7.8 million for the full benchmark suite (ranging
from 310.4 thousand to 1.33 million for individual benchmarks). Despite the test space
sampling, compared to related fault injection based works, we performed significantly
more extensive fault injection tests that, coupled with the detailed collected test results,
enabled us to thoroughly elaborate on them, as we discuss in the rest of this chapter.
3.2 Workload-Related Vulnerability Variation
In the rest of this chapter an analysis is performed on the gathered information from the
injection experiments. Before delving into more exploitable insight, first an analysis
of the results is shown at a higher level mainly to show the overall workload-related
vulnerability variations.
Fig. 3.1 shows the breakdown of the exact end-to-end corruption effects on the
tested benchmarks. Similar to existing studies, the presented breakdown reconfirms
that hardware faults have varying effects on application behavior. Out of 7.8 million
performed fault injection tests on NPB-serial, 61.1% resulted in correct execution,
indicating that exhaustive protection is unnecessary. As for the rest outcomes, 23.5%
of the total tests resulted in SDCs, 15% in application crashes, 0.3% in application
stalls and less than 0.1% in delayed correct executions.
More importantly it can be observed that the number of faults that corrupted silently
the output varied per benchmark; the reported occurrences of SDCs ranged from 5.8%
for DC up to 37.9% for IS. Given that it suffices to protect only against SDCs, we
can further reduce the amount of data that need strong protection. Protecting only
against SDCs suffices because they are the only type of corruption outcome that is
undetectable online by any means, plus they do not cause any observable indication
that something happened out of the ordinary. All other execution corruption outcomes
are observable as they upset the execution in a visible way (i.e., application stall, crash
or delay) and detectable by conventional methods (e.g., by software-visible symptom-
based fault detection that monitors for suspicious software behaviors/symptoms).
The presented breakdown of corruption effects is for the tests performed following
our experimental setup and for the set sample rates (as shown in Table 3.1). These



























Figure 3.1: Breakdown of application behavior under corruption for each tested NPB-serial
application (including total breakdown for all performed tests)
results are cumulative per benchmark and would be different if different sample rates
had been chosen. E.g., as the sample rate is driven by the total load accesses, a de-
creased sample rate would test more the more-frequently accessed data and the total
breakdown would be skewed by their vulnerability. Despite that, these results were
shown here to demonstrate that there is varying application behavior under data cor-
ruption and that this is worth investigating. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, the
vulnerability variations are shown for individual combinations of corrupted location
characteristics.
To conclude, Fig. 3.1 showed that application behavior under data corruption varies
depending on the benchmark indicating that applications have different inherent vul-
nerability characteristics. These variations are mostly attributed to each program’s
data-level sensitivities and their data access patterns. As such, it is promising to move
into an application data vulnerability investigation to gain more insight.
3.3 Application Data Vulnerability Variation
Given the volume of our experiments and the detailed captured information of the
corrupted data characteristics, we can characterize the application data vulnerabilities
based on the data characteristics. For this purpose we introduce an experiment-based
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Figure 3.2: Varying eDVF depending on the location of the tested data in the memory address
space for each NPB-serial benchmark. Total indicates the reported SDCs per benchmark.
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Figure 3.3: Varying eDVF depending on the size (in bytes) of the tested data for each NPB-
serial benchmark. Total indicates the reported SDCs per benchmark.
Data Vulnerability Factor (eDVF) that we define as the probability of a corruption in
specified data categories to result into an SDC. Contrary to the well-known vulner-
ability factors that estimate through modeling the probability of a fault in a specific
structure for a given application to corrupt the output [31, 46, 47], we use our testing
results to calculate the eDVF as the fraction of tests, on application data with specific
characteristics, that resulted in an SDC for a given application.
Fig. 3.2-3.5 show the eDVF variation over the tested NPB-serial benchmarks for the
different data characteristics that our fault injection framework can identify. Generally
most eDVFs are around 0.2, with limited exceptions going as high as 0.83, and quite
a few being less than 0.05. This points out that it is possible to rank application data
based on their probability to cause an SDC according to the data characteristics. In a
few cases, eDVFs are down to zero due to no reported SDC outcomes or due to absence
of the particular data categories in the specific benchmark. Both of these causes of zero
eDVFs indicate the particular data categories as less-vulnerable for the application in
3.3. Application Data Vulnerability Variation 33












Figure 3.4: Varying eDVF depending on the user (system library or user data) of the tested
data for each NPB-serial benchmark. Total indicates the reported SDCs per benchmark.





















Figure 3.5: Varying eDVF depending on the usage type (see Table 2.1) of the tested data for
each NPB-serial benchmark. Total indicates the reported SDCs per benchmark.
question.
System library data (Fig. 3.4) are less vulnerable almost consistently across all
benchmarks as they tend not to be output related and if corrupted tend to get masked
or cause crashes. On the contrary, in some benchmarks, there is a trend of longer data
being more vulnerable (Fig. 3.3), as longer data often hold output-related values and
thus if corrupted are more likely to corrupt the output too. This is more evident in the
benchmarks that use the longer 16-byte sized long double data. As for the usage type
eDVFs (Fig. 3.5), there is no benchmark wide observation to be made. Despite that,
they can be used per application basis to rank the vulnerability of their application data
according to their type. Moreover, given the application’s data access patterns, they
can explain the total application-level vulnerability variations.
Given the volume of our tests, our study captures the varying vulnerabilities of
application data per application with a high statistical confidence. Since there are
numerous ways to correlate the application data characteristics to the corruption out-
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come, only an informative set per single data characteristics was presented here. The
detailed results of our experiments allow us to compute the eDVFs for combined data
characteristics to characterize more closely the application data vulnerabilities. Given
single-characteristic eDVFs for an arbitrary number of different data characteristics,
the combined eDVF for a given benchmark can generally be computed by multiplying
all the individual eDVFs with the ratio of the total number of data in the benchmark that
fit all the characteristics by the total number of data that fit at least one of the character-
istics. E.g., the eDVF of global-8B-user-integers in BT is the product of eDVFBT-global,
eDVFBT-8B, eDVFBT-user, eDVFBT-int and the fraction (number of data in BT that are
global-8B-user-int)/(number of data in BT that are either global or 8B or user or int).
Although there seems to be no common behavior of eDVFs across the tested bench-
marks, given the volume of our tests, our eDVFs investigation captures the varying vul-
nerability factors of application data per application. As eDVFs can be computed for
all combinations of data characteristics for a given application, they can be exploited to
rank application data according to their expected vulnerability to drive a vulnerability-
aware protection mechanism, i.e., for a given application we can tell which data types
are less prone to cause an SDC and thus protect them less than the rest.
3.3.1 Per-Bit Vulnerability Variation within Application Data
Moving deeper in our investigation we can get more consistent vulnerability insight
by observing how the data corruption effects vary depending on the exact bit location
of the corruption. As a showcase of this, Fig. 3.6 depicts the reported outcomes of all
performed fault-injection tests depending on the exact bit location of the injected cor-
ruption. As this includes all tests across all benchmarks, it cannot be comprehensively
used to estimate the eDVFs per bit for any application data.
Nevertheless it can be seen that there are patterns of vulnerability variation among
different bits of application data. Moreover there are patterns when considering the
other non-SDC corruption outcomes too. The observed cutoff points of the vulnerabil-
ity patterns are mainly explained by the different sizes of the tested application data,
especially between 8-byte and 16-byte data, and the non-uniform distribution of tests
between different data sizes. As our framework tested uniformly on memory load ac-
cesses, the number of tests performed per data size reflect the distribution of accesses
of these data sizes in the tested applications. In any case, all these point out that there
is potential in per-bit eDVF analysis, especially by investigating the eDVF per-bit of
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Figure 3.6: Varying eDVF per bit of all tested data for all NPB-serial benchmarks combined.
specific single combinations of data usage types and sizes.
In Fig. 3.7-3.14 the per-bit eDVF analysis is shown for specific combinations of data
usage types and sizes. The per-bit eDVF distribution varies among application data
usage type categories (as classified in Table 2.1) while, most importantly, it shows
consistently common location patterns per each category across most of the tested
NPB-serial benchmarks.
For given combinations of usage types and data sizes, the bits that are more likely
to result into an SDC tend to be concentrated in continuous bit ranges either at the
MSBs (Fig. 3.7-3.8) or at the LSBs (Fig. 3.9-3.14) of application data for most of
the tested benchmarks, while the remaining bit ranges have generally near-zero (or a
distinctly lower) eDVF per bit making them candidates for reduced fault protection.
All these suggest that we can clearly identify bit ranges within particular application
data with distinct vulnerability levels to confidently conclude that application data are
vulnerable in parts.
More precisely, for the tested floating-point data (FP-8B, Fig. 3.7) the less-vulnerable
bit ranges are located at their LSBs across most of the tested benchmarks, while mov-
ing towards the MSBs the per-bit eDVF increases steadily. When considering as less-
vulnerable bits those with per-bit eDVF less than 0.01, the less-vulnerable bit-range
width varies from 20 LSBs for SP up to 32 LSBs for CG, while many of these bits
never resulted in an SDC. For the tested FPs, most of the non-SDC observed out-
comes were correct executions. The observed bit-range vulnerability variations are
explained by the nature of FPs where their LSBs only affect the accuracy of compu-
tations, are often discarded by rounding and tend not to affect the outcome. Moving
to MSBs it is expected that a corruption there will cause more upset to the data and as













































Figure 3.7: Varying eDVF per bit of tested FP data (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.













































Figure 3.8: Varying eDVF per bit of tested INT (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.
Background bars show the per-bit outcome breakdown in total over all benchmarks.
such the likelihood of resulting into an SDC increases. This also explains the varying
less-vulnerable bit-range width among applications as they have different precision re-
quirements. Moreover, it also explains the observed behavior in IS (Integer Sorting)
that is different than the other benchmarks. As FPs in IS are not part of the input/output
but are controlling the execution, they are more likely to corrupt the output.
Similar to the FP data, the less-vulnerable bit ranges in the tested INT2 data are
located at their LSBs (INT-8B, Fig. 3.8) but show higher eDVF per bit than their FP
counterparts, while the pattern holds for higher eDVFs per bit when moving towards
the MSBs. When considering as less-vulnerable bits those with per-bit eDVF less than
0.10, the less-vulnerable bit-range width varies from 24 LSBs for LU up to 43 LSBs
for EP (not including DC and IS). This common behavior suggests that data holding
values related to the computation, as both FPs and INTs do, tend to corrupt the output
2As INT data we denote all non floating-point application data that are not used for addressing
memory.
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Figure 3.9: Varying eDVF per bit of tested IP (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark. Back-














































Figure 3.10: Varying eDVF per bit of tested PTR (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.
Background bars show the per-bit outcome breakdown in total over all benchmarks.
more when they are corrupted at a greater magnitude (i.e., at MSBs). INTs can also be
separated into distinct bit ranges with different vulnerability levels. Though, as they
are used in many different application specific ways (that we do not yet detect), there is
more variation in the width of the less-vulnerable ranges and not a common increasing
eDVF pattern in the more-vulnerable bit ranges, as it was the case for the FPs.
Generally, as the data types discussed so far often hold output-related values, cor-
ruption at their MSBs tends to result into SDCs and corruption at LSBs into correct
executions mostly. Moving on to memory addressing data (Fig. 3.9-3.13), we notice a
reversal of the behavior under data corruption where corruption at LSBs tends to result
into SDCs and corruption at MSBs into application crashes mostly. This is expected
behavior as corruptions in MSBs of memory addressing data will lead to pointers into
invalid memory locations and thus cause an application crash. On the contrary, corrup-
tions in LSBs are more likely to lead to pointers into valid memory locations with unde-
sired contents (or incorrect instructions) and thus corrupt the application output (or the












































Figure 3.11: Varying eDVF per bit of tested PTRMR (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.














































Figure 3.12: Varying eDVF per bit of tested PTRTP (8 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.
Background bars show the per-bit outcome breakdown in total over all benchmarks.
instruction flow) but without causing an immediate application crash. This is why the
more-vulnerable bit-range width of IP data is narrower than the PTR/PTRMR/PTRTP
that are similar. The application program space is narrower compared to the data mem-
ory space and, thus, there are less bits in IPs (than in PRT/PTRMR/PTRTP) that if
corrupted could still point to a valid location and not cause an application crash but an
SDC. Nevertheless, this clear behavior under data corruption for most benchmarks still
allows us to identify distinct vulnerability levels within different bit ranges of memory
addressing data too.
As shown, it is promising to move into characterizing the effects of data corrup-
tion based on the corrupted bit location in specific application data that are classified
according to their high-level characteristics (i.e., usage type, size). Especially due to
the usage-type-based classification, we were able to get (a) more exploitable insight
regarding the vulnerability of usage types that further explains the previous eDVF
per usage-type results (Fig. 3.5) and (b) more consistent results among most bench-













































Figure 3.13: Varying eDVF per bit of tested PTRTP (4 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.













































Figure 3.14: Varying eDVF per bit of tested INT (4 bytes) for each NPB-serial benchmark.
Background bars show the per-bit outcome breakdown in total over all benchmarks.
marks regarding the location patterns of more-vulnerable application data parts. What
changes across benchmarks is the exact width of the less-vulnerable bit range and the
vulnerability intensity of the more-vulnerable bit ranges.
Similar analysis could be performed for each of the other identified characteristics
of the corrupted data (i.e., location, user) or for the total per-bit eDVFs for all tested
benchmarks combined. Such analysis though would not provide the same exploitable
insight as the per usage type analysis because the per-bit variation of vulnerabilities
depends mostly on how the data-under-consideration are used by the application. If we
were to show the bit-level eDVF variation for, e.g., global application data, it would
capture the vulnerability characteristics of many different data usage types without
helping to make any significant observation. For more detailed insight the eDVF per-
bit variation can be also analyzed for combined data characteristics.
As we can now identify clear bit ranges within particular application data with
distinct vulnerability levels, the bit-level insight can be used instead of the higher-level
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eDVFs to rank application data more accurately. On top of that, the clear partition
of application data in more-vulnerable and less-vulnerable parts helps to move further
into a bit-level finer granularity of vulnerability-aware protection of application data to
further reduce the amount of data under strong protection.
3.4 Memory Space Vulnerability Variation
In the previous section we focused on application data vulnerabilities depending on the
data characteristics. In this section, we will extrapolate the testing results to show the
vulnerability variations within the tested applications’ memory space.
The memory space vulnerability variation is still a data-dependent variation but
can offer a broader insight and new exploitation potential compared to the previously
discussed vulnerability variations. Memory space vulnerability is a very intuitive area
to focus on, especially given the way we performed the fault-injection tests. As a
reminder, just before a memory load access, the single bit-flip faults were injected at
the loaded memory location and it was straightforward to capture the corrupted data
memory address.
Given that this memory address of the corrupted data is among the reported cor-
ruption characteristics, here we observe the relation between the corruption outcomes
and the corrupted data memory address to elaborate on the memory space vulnerabil-
ity variation. Fig. 3.15-3.16 show the breakdown of the reported corruption outcomes
depending on the corrupted memory address for each tested workload.
As each workload does not access the exact same memory space ranges, each work-
load is shown on a separate figure where only the memory space ranges accessed by
it are shown. This includes all memory areas accessed during execution (heap, stack,
global/static area). Each point on the horizontal axis is not a single memory loca-
tion but rather a group of adjacent memory locations plotted against the breakdown
of outcomes of the total tests performed within this group of adjacent memory loca-
tions. Each memory location may have been tested multiple times depending on the
frequency that the application accesses it. The distribution of tests is shown by the blue
dotted lines and follows the memory load hotspots during execution. The non-uniform
distribution of the tests over the memory space is because the tests were distributed
uniformly over the memory load accesses and not the memory addresses.
Out of the figures, it can be seen that the observed outcome breakdown varies
over the tested memory space and among the different workloads. More importantly
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Breakdown of outcomes over the tested memory space
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Breakdown of outcomes over the tested memory space


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Breakdown of outcomes over the tested memory space














































































































































































































































































Figure 3.15: Tested memory space vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes for
BT, CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks.
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Breakdown of outcomes over the tested memory space
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Breakdown of outcomes over the tested memory space










































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.16: Tested memory space vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes for
IS, LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks.
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there are distinct memory space ranges with distinctly different corruption outcome
percentages. These are mostly attributed to the different memory space areas (heap,
stack vs global) and the different types of data mostly occupying that area in each
benchmark. Generally there is useful insight in the memory space vulnerability. E.g.,
there are memory ranges where the only other observed outcome (apart from SDCs)
are correct executions only or memory ranges where the non-SDC outcome probability
remains constant.
If we focus only on SDCs, the exploitability of the memory space vulnerability
still holds. There are still are distinct memory space ranges with distinct vulnerability
levels. These can be explained also mainly due to shifting between the global, heap
and stack segments and moreover due to the distribution of data types. E.g., the heap of
BT is mainly occupied by floating-point data, hence it exhibits a constant vulnerability
factor of 0.2 throughout its heap.
To conclude, what is most interesting is that there are again distinct levels of vulner-
ability over the tested memory space and that provides exploitable insight by various
ways. Unfortunately there are no common specific patterns among all benchmarks
(at the exact same address ranges) mainly because application data are not distributed
in the memory space the same way among applications. Nevertheless the memory
space vulnerability variation has potential if it is to be exploited in a per-application
basis. E.g., in a hardware reliability approach, the main memory could provide un-
equal multi-levels of protection where some areas may be protected more if they are
more vulnerable to result into an SDC if corrupted. Alternatively, the vulnerability of
memory space could be used as a quick way to identify and map vulnerable data to
stronger-protected cache banks. Another approach, in a software reliability approach,
would be to increase the redundancy and checking of instructions accessing the more-
vulnerable memory ranges.
3.5 Register File Vulnerability Variation
So far, the presented vulnerability insight was mainly at application data level and
pointed out how to achieve the same protection for less cost at application data level
only. Given the injected fault model (data corruption at application data directly), it
was straightforward to analyze the exact corruption effects in relation to the character-
istics of the corrupted data. Although our fault-injection tests were data-level aware,
we are not limited to investigating application data vulnerabilities only. Due to the ex-
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tra information reported during the fault-injection tests related to the corruption char-
acteristics, we can observe the vulnerability variation of other hardware/software areas
too, targeting to obtain more exploitable insight in order to improve their reliability
mechanisms too.
In the rest of this chapter, we show what other vulnerability insight we can observe
by extrapolating our fault model to model other fault-injection locations by analyzing
the reported outcomes to other reported corruption characteristics.
First, in this section, we will extrapolate the reported corruption information to show
the vulnerability variations within the register file.
As a reminder of our fault-injection tool operation, once a fault is injected into a
memory location just before a memory load access, the corrupted data are eventually
affecting an output register through the executing instruction at the moment of fault
injection. It is safe to assume that although the fault was injected into a memory
location, it is equivalent to being injected into the register file and corrupting that first
register. As we capture and report this first register to load the corrupted data, we can
easily use the existing results to elaborate on the vulnerability of the register file for
the tested benchmarks without requiring to remodel/re-execute our tests.
Fig. 3.17 shows the breakdown of corruption outcomes depending on the first reg-
ister to load the corrupted data for all NPB-serial benchmarks combined. Only the
registers that were reported more than 100 times are shown to ensure the confidence of
the results. As expected again, the tests are not uniformly distributed over the register


























































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per register
Figure 3.17: Tested register vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes for all
NPB-serial benchmarks combined. Only the registers tested more than 100 times are shown.
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Number of tests per register
Figure 3.18: Tested register vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes for BT,
CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks. Only the registers reported more than 100 times are shown.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per register
Figure 3.19: Tested register vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes for IS,
LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks. Only the registers reported more than 100 times are shown.
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The figure also shows the register vulnerability factor per register as a percentage of
reported SDC outcomes over the total number of times this register was reported. Al-
though most registers experience SDCs if corrupted, there are registers that experience
significantly less SDCs and thus can be deemed as less-vulnerable ones. Interestingly
the xmm registers that tend to hold the floating-point data, have a register VF around
0.2, while the rest reported outcomes are almost only correct executions, following the
floating-point data observations made in earlier sections.
The observed register vulnerability factors for all benchmarks combined are not
safe to be exploited in a benchmark-agnostic fashion because the tests per register
type are not distributed equally among the different benchmarks and because a specific
register’s outcome breakdown varies per application.
Fig. 3.18-3.19 depict the breakdown of corruption outcomes depending on the first
register to load the corrupted data per each tested benchmark. The only common be-
havior is regarding the xmm registers (except for IS) that tend to have similar vulner-
ability factor per benchmark, while the rest reported corruption outcomes tend to be
almost only correct executions. This, once more, is explained by the high occupancy
of xmm registers by floating-point data.
Despite the non benchmark-wide observations, a per-application profiling can still
point to some exploitable insight. The registers can be ranked per-application accord-
ing to their vulnerability in order to assign their protection strength accordingly. As the
register file is relatively small there would be not much benefits in adapting an existing
register file hardware protection mechanism.
On the contrary, there is more potential for savings in software-level reliability
mechanisms that could become aware of which registers tend to hold data that tend to
be more vulnerable. In such a scenario, a software-level reliability mechanism could
take care to replicate the data stored in such registers and also drive the more vulner-
able data to the registers usually occupied by more vulnerable data to minimize the
vulnerable area of the register file. The reverse intuitive approach of targeting to use
more the less-vulnerable registers would not work as intended because the registers’
vulnerability reflects the vulnerability of the data that they hold.
3.6 Instruction-Level Vulnerability Variation
In a similar fashion as before, in this section we will extrapolate the original injected
fault model to model instruction-level faults to observe vulnerability variations in re-
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lation to instruction-level characteristics. Assisted by the reported corruption infor-
mation relating to the instruction at the moment of fault injection and the instruction
using first the corrupted data, we will discuss on instruction-level and program space
vulnerability variations.
Although we injected faults at memory locations just before a memory load access,
it is possible to infer instruction-level vulnerabilities. Due to the reported information
of our fault-injection tool, we can collect information such as (a) the instruction opcode
at the moment of the fault injection, (b) the instruction opcode of the first instruction
to use the first affected register, (c) the instruction pointer at the moment of the fault
injection and (d) the instruction counter at the moment of the fault injection.
All these were straightforward to be collected by our fault-injection tool and make
up some interesting characteristics to be investigated hereafter in this section. In par-
ticular, we will (a) model the vulnerability of instructions if they are targeted by a fault,
(b) model the vulnerability of instructions if they use a corrupted operand, (c) model
the vulnerability variations within the program space and (d) observe possible program
vulnerability phases.
3.6.1 Per Instruction Type at Fault Injection
During our fault-injection tests, the faults were injected just before instructions that
caused a memory load operation. As we capture the opcode of that instruction, we can






























































































































































































































































































Number of tests per instruction
Figure 3.20: Tested instruction vulnerability variation at fault injection and breakdown of
rest outcomes for all NPB-serial benchmarks combined. Only opcodes reported more than 100
times are shown.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per instruction
Figure 3.21: Tested instruction vulnerability variation at fault injection and breakdown of
rest outcomes for BT, CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks. Only opcodes reported more than 100
times are shown.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per instruction
Figure 3.22: Tested instruction vulnerability variation at fault injection and breakdown of
rest outcomes for IS, LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks. Only opcodes reported more than 100
times are shown.
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modeled using that information are only for instructions that load corrupted data from
memory. Such instructions may either use the corrupted data immediately (e.g., adding
a register value to a value from memory) or move the corrupted data from memory.
Fig. 3.20 shows the breakdown of corruption outcomes depending on the instruc-
tion type at the moment of fault injection for all NPB-serial benchmarks combined.
Only the instruction opcodes that were reported more than 100 times are shown to en-
sure the confidence of the results, while the distribution of the tests over the reported
opcodes is also shown. The figure also shows the instruction vulnerability factor per
opcode as a percentage of reported SDC outcomes over the total number of times that
this opcode was reported.
Although this considers only instructions that load corrupted data and, thus, limits
the instruction types under consideration, it still provides an indication of instruction-
level vulnerabilities. Ranking such instructions based on their probability to result into
an SDC, if they load corrupted data, can be used as a guideline on which instructions
to protect stronger. This also holds if we consider that this can model the corruption
happening inside the functional unit implementing the given instruction; e.g., the out-
come breakdown of an ADD where one of the operands has a corrupted bit is the same
with the outcome breakdown where the operands are correct but a single output bit is
wrongly calculated.
The tests are not uniformly distributed over the instruction types and, as before, the
presented instruction-level vulnerability for all benchmarks combined is not safe to be
exploited in an benchmark-agnostic fashion. An exception holds for those clear results
that are explained due to the instruction type itself, e.g., the non-vulnerable instructions
AND and TEST that have zero vulnerability factors across all benchmarks.
More usable insight can be gained in a per-application profiling. Fig. 3.21-3.22
show the same breakdown of execution outcomes per each tested benchmark. It still
holds that instruction types may be ranked depending on their vulnerabilities in a per-
application basis.
If we focus only on the reported SDC percentages, it is interesting that there are
clear vulnerability variations among different opcodes, while some of them never re-
ported an SDC despite the large number of times reported. This points out that it is
promising to rank opcodes based on their vulnerability so that we employ more mea-
sures to ensure that a memory-loaded value has been correct for those instruction op-
codes with higher vulnerability to result into an SDC. Similarly, if we assume that the
corruption occurs within the functional/arithmetic units that implement the instruction
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(only for instructions that do indeed use the corrupted data), then this can point out
which units to protect stronger than others. Equally interesting exploitation potential
lies with these instructions that never reported an SDC.
3.6.2 Per Instruction Type at First Consumption
of Corrupted Operand
During our fault-injection tests, the faults were injected just before instructions that
caused a memory load operation. Then these instructions could either use the loaded
corrupted data immediately or just move them from the memory to a register. In both
cases, there is always an output register that is affected by these instructions.
Here we target the instruction-level vulnerability variations of the first consumer of
the corrupted data. In other words, we observe the instruction-related vulnerability to
result into an SDC, if the instruction is the first to use the first affected register as an
input register after the instruction at fault injection.
To achieve this we need the opcode information of this first consumer of the cor-
rupted register that is provided by our tool. The process of obtaining this is different
than the other instruction-related captured information. To capture the instruction op-
code, instruction pointer and instruction counter at the moment of fault injection was
straightforward.
On the contrary, to capture the intended instruction opcode required tracking the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per Instruction
Figure 3.23: Tested instruction vulnerability variation (at first consumption of corrupted
operand) and breakdown of rest outcomes for all NPB-serial benchmarks combined. Only
opcodes reported more than 100 times are shown.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per Instruction
Figure 3.24: Tested instruction vulnerability variation (at first consumption of corrupted
operand) and breakdown of rest outcomes for BT, CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks. Only
opcodes reported more than 100 times are shown.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of tests per Instruction
Figure 3.25: Tested instruction vulnerability variation (at first consumption of corrupted
operand) and breakdown of rest outcomes for IS, LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks. Only
opcodes reported more than 100 times are shown.
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by an instruction. This tracking of the first affected register by the corruption is for
a window of 1000 instructions. If by the end of this instruction window the register
hasn’t been used by a later instruction as an input register or if the application crashes
first, then this case will be reported as an ‘unused’ case.
As there is the possibility of this register being overwritten before its first use as an
input register, the tool makes sure to monitor and report such cases as ‘masked’. This
doesn’t mean that the initial memory corruption got masked but that the register where
the corrupted data first got loaded got masked. The corrupted data will still reside in
the memory, unless overwritten in the meantime.
There is also a special common case where, at fault injection, when the corrupted
data are loaded from the memory, they do not get stored to a register but the outcome
of their processing is stored to one of the bits of the flags register. In that case the flags
register is assumed as the first register affected by the corrupted data. As such it is very
likely to be overwritten by a later instruction and being reported as another ‘masked’
instance.
As all these help gather information about the first instruction to use the first af-
fected register by the initial corruption, we can show the variation of corruption out-
comes depending on the opcode of the first instruction after the fault injection to
use the first affected register. Fig. 3.23 shows this outcome breakdown for all NPB-
serial benchmarks combined, along with the observed instruction vulnerability factors.
Again, only the instruction opcodes that were reported more than 100 times are shown,
along with the distribution of tests over the reported opcodes.
It may be observed that different instruction opcodes have different vulnerability to
result into an SDC if they are the first to consume the affected register. This points out
that there is exploitation potential. Although the corruption does not happen within the
instruction types under consideration, this type of instruction vulnerability can point
out where extra protection needs to be added to ensure that the vulnerable instruction
gets correct data at their input registers.
If the same vulnerabilities are observed per tested benchmark (Fig. 3.24-3.25),
there are more clear areas of where to focus. There are more instruction types that
are more invulnerable to faults in their input operands and there is still a clear variation
to the rest instructions, although this variation does not hold across benchmarks. For
the instance of the reported ‘unused’ cases, it can be seen that all such cases result only
into crashes and not any SDCs, meaning that the crash happened before the register
was used again by any instruction.
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Despite the non benchmark-wide observations, using the vulnerability of instruc-
tion types when one of their operands is corrupted can be exploited in various ways.
E.g., there is potential in a software-level reliability mechanism that focuses on a
stronger check of the correctness of input operands only for the more-vulnerable in-
struction types.
3.6.3 Program Space Vulnerability
Given that our fault-injection tool captures and reports the instruction pointer of the
instruction executing at the moment of the fault injection, we can use this information
to relate the corruption outcomes to the instruction pointer value at fault injection in
order to observe the tested benchmarks’ program space vulnerability variations.
Fig. 3.26-3.27 show the breakdown of the reported corruption outcomes over the
program space for each tested workload. As each workload does not reside in the ex-
act same program space ranges, each one is shown on a separate figure where only the
instruction locations that triggered a fault injection are shown. This includes both the
workload’s space and the used libraries’ space. Each point on the horizontal axis is a
group of adjacent memory locations storing instructions plotted against the breakdown
of outcomes of the total tests performed within this group of instructions. The distri-
bution of tests over the program space is shown by the blue dotted lines. As it follows
the program execution hotspots (of instructions that cause memory load accesses) it
resulted into a non-uniform test distribution once again.
The target is to notice distinct ranges within the program space with distinct vul-
nerability levels and distinct breakdown of the rest corruption outcomes. Generally, it
can be seen that the bottom parts of the program space, where the library/system bi-
naries are loaded into, have near-zero occurrences of SDCs (as shown too in Fig. 3.4)
and tend to result into either a correct execution or an application crash when a fault is
injected during their execution.
On the contrary, most SDCs occur at the workload’s space but there is not a com-
mon pattern to be observed among workloads. Still though there is room for exploita-
tion for single workloads where there appear to be continuous ranges with higher vul-
nerability than other ranges. This implies that there are application code parts that can
be collectively marked as more vulnerable instead of marking individual instructions
as such.
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Breakdown of outcomes over the tested program space




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Breakdown of outcomes over the tested program space




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Breakdown of outcomes over the tested program space

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.26: Tested program space vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes
for BT, CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks.
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Figure 3.27: Tested program space vulnerability variation and breakdown of rest outcomes
for IS, LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks.
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3.6.4 Program Vulnerability Phases
As the just presented program space vulnerability does not account for the program
phases, here we look into possible program phase related vulnerability patterns. As our
fault-injection tool reports back the instruction counter at the moment of fault injection,
it is straightforward to observe the outcome breakdown of corruptions over the lifetime
of an executing workload to identify possible program vulnerability phases.
Fig. 3.28-3.29 show the breakdown of the reported corruption outcomes against the
time the fault injection occurred (as measured by the instruction counter). As before,
each workload is shown separately. Unlike before, the test distribution is uniform
because we injected the faults in a way to distribute them uniformly over the memory
accesses that occur uniformly over time.
Out of the figures it can be seen that in most benchmarks there are clear repeating
patterns over time per benchmark for all reported corruption outcome occurrences.
This indicates that an application may have distinct program vulnerability phases that
mostly reflect the program execution phases. For most of the tested applications they
appear to be such vulnerability phases per application at the beginning of the execution,
at the end of the execution and one repeating in-between.
It is interesting that these outcome patterns are present for all types of reported
outcomes. What usually tends to vary, apart from the pattern’s strength, is the length
of the repeating pattern over time; some benchmarks have phases longer than other.
Moreover, it is highly useful that there are application intervals that don’t exhibit all
corruption outcomes, e.g., in DC and MG there are long time intervals where almost
zero SDC percentages were observed.
Moving on to considering only the SDC occurrences, there are still vulnerability
patterns to indicate program vulnerability phases. As it was expected, there are no
common vulnerability phases across all benchmarks, indicating that there is more po-
tential in a per-application basis.
Identifying program vulnerability phases has great exploitation potential. As it
points out when, during the execution, an application becomes more vulnerable, it can
drive a time-aware reliability mechanism that strengthens during specific time inter-
vals. Moreover, especially for repeating program vulnerability phases, it can be used
to prepare protection strategies for a particular vulnerability phase pattern and deploy
the strategy repeatedly to deal with the specific vulnerability phase footprint. Similarly,
it can be used to break an application into vulnerability phases where each one has a
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Figure 3.28: Observed program vulnerability phases and breakdown of rest outcomes per
program phase for BT, CG, DC, EP and FT benchmarks.
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Figure 3.29: Observed program vulnerability phases and breakdown of rest outcomes per
program phase for IS, LU, MG, SP and UA benchmarks.
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different protection strategy applied to it depending on the vulnerability phase pattern.
Finally, identifying program vulnerability phases could be used to reduce the cost of
evaluating reliability mechanisms. This holds true especially for the identified repeat-
ing phases, where one can avoid repeatedly testing a repeating vulnerability phase, by
testing only one instance of it.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we observed how application behavior varies under data corruption
depending on the characteristics of the corruption and the executing workload.
For that purpose, using our SWIFI framework, we setup and performed an exces-
sive testing of the NPB-serial benchmark suite comprising of 7.8 million fault-injection
tests in total (Section 3.1). First we presented the top-level workload-related vulnera-
bility variations in NPB-serial (Section 3.2) that indicated that applications have dif-
ferent inherent vulnerability characteristics.
The amount of performed tests and the reported information enabled us to further
our investigation at data level to observe the application data related vulnerability vari-
ations (Section 3.3). We showed how the application behavior in NPB-serial bench-
marks varied depending on the high-level characteristics of the corrupted application
data; in particular, in relation to the (a) size, (b) usage type, (c) user and (d) memory
space location of the corrupted data.
As generally there were no application-independent vulnerability observations to
be made, we moved on to a finer-granularity characterization where we showed how
the application data vulnerability in NPB-serial benchmarks varied depending on the
exact bit location of the injected corruption (Section 3.3.1). This allowed to safely
identify distinct bit ranges within application data types where the probability to result
into an SDC, if corrupted, is very low.
Then we moved beyond to elaborate on areas of vulnerability other than appli-
cation data related. Given the reported information by our fault-injection tool (relat-
ing to the corruption characteristics and the corruption effects) and our original fault
model (single bit flips at memory locations just before memory load accesses), we ex-
trapolated the original fault model to model as many other locations of corruption as
possible without the need to remodel and repeat the experiments. This enabled to ob-
serve the vulnerability variations of NPB-serial benchmarks within the memory space
(Section 3.4), the register file (Section 3.5) and among instruction-level characteris-
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tics (Section 3.6), including instruction type vulnerability variations, program space
vulnerability variations and program vulnerability phase detection.
Out of all the observed vulnerability variations the most interesting ones related to
the per-bit variations within application data. These pointed out that it was useful to
move in a bit-level and data-aware investigation of vulnerabilities as what drives the
vulnerability of data is mostly the way they are used by the application.
We showed that, when considering combinations of data usage types and data sizes,
there are distinct bit ranges within application data with distinct vulnerability levels.
This led to conclude that application data are vulnerable in parts. The data types hold-
ing output-related values have less-vulnerable continuous bit ranges at their MSBs,
while memory addressing data at their LSBs. E.g., each of the 32 LSBs of FPs in
CG has less than 1% probability to cause an SDC if corrupted. As the observed
less-vulnerable bit ranges were wide and experienced near-zero SDCs, they showed
promise for a high exploitation potential, as we will establish in the next chapter.
Moreover, this observed vulnerability of data in parts showed high exploitability
potential, among other reasons, also due to holding true for most of the tested bench-
marks. Generally very few application-independent observations could be made re-
lating to the other investigated vulnerability variations. Despite that, the characteriza-
tion results still showed exploitation potential in various locations (as it was mentioned
throughout this chapter), even if they are to be used in a per-application basis assuming
a previously vulnerability-characterized application. Nevertheless, all results pointed
out that application behavior can be characterized based on the characteristics of the
corruption and the executing application.
In the next chapter we will investigate on the potential benefits of exploiting the gained
characterization insight in order to reduce the overhead of reliability mechanisms. In
particular, out of all the observed vulnerability insight, we are going to focus on ex-





In this chapter we build upon the gained characterization insight from Chapter 3 in
order to optimally exploit the application behavior under data corruption.
In particular, we will show the potential benefits of exploiting the per-bit data-level
vulnerability variations in a vulnerability-driven manner targeting the reliability-over-
heads reduction in a reduced-cost unequally-protected data cache that offers two levels
of fault-protection strength while running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
Among the insight of the characterization study, data-level vulnerability factors
were estimated for a given workload, down to identifying distinct bit ranges with dif-
ferent vulnerability levels within specific types of application data. This can be in-
tuitively exploited by shifting to vulnerability-aware unequal-protection architectures
where the protection strength is driven by the application data vulnerability. Our in-
tension is to introduce the unequal protection within a given structure or same-level
structures and not among different structures.
We argue that such a shift is beneficial as it reduces the fault-protected surface
for a given reliability QoS level and, as such, reduce the reliability costs by avoiding
excessive strong protection of the less-vulnerable application data. Considering that
our characterization study goes down to bit-level vulnerability estimation, the perfor-
mance/cost benefits can be maximized for an even smoother trading off against reli-
ability. This is contrary to traditional reliability approaches that either unnecessarily
protect all parts equally and exhaustively [16, 19, 52, 11] or offer unequal protection
agnostic to the actual distribution of likelihood of the application’s data to corrupt the
65
66 Chapter 4. Exploiting Application Behavior Characterization
execution output [55, 22, 23].
As mentioned throughout Chapter 3, the various characterization insight shows nu-
merous ways of exploitation potential depending on the observed area of vulnerability
variations and the design targets. Therefore, in Section 4.1 first we justify why out of
all the alternative options we decided to exploit that particular characterization insight
in that particular way and then we discuss on the desired characteristics for identify-
ing areas of high exploitability potential (Subsection 4.1.1) to maximize the potential
benefits.
Then in Section 4.2 we describe how we profiled the contents of a data cache run-
ning the NPB-serial benchmarks in order to obtain the occupancy rates of data types
within the data cache. This is both to identify if exploiting the per-bit vulnerability
variation of NPB-serial in a data cache adheres to the high exploitability character-
istics of Subsection 4.1.1 and also to help measure the optimal potential benefits in
Section 4.3. The potential benefits will be shown in terms of strongly-protected sur-
face reduction against to what effect on the fault coverage. These benefits are presented
to demonstrate the upper exploitation limits of the application behavior under data cor-
ruption. To do so, we assumed an optimal fault-tolerant cache design that can adapt to
unequally protect its contents. Therefore, before concluding this chapter, we discuss
on the practicality of our exploitation approach and on ways to improve it.
4.1 Exploitation Alternatives
There are numerous alternative ways, design targets, areas and mechanisms (also shown
in Fig. 4.1) that offer grounds for exploiting the application behavior under data cor-
ruption.
Out of all the possible ways and targets to exploit the observed characterization
insight, we focus on exploiting it for shifting into vulnerability-driven unequal-
protection architectures to reduce the reliability associated costs with a minimum
effect on the fault coverage against SDCs. Out of all the gained insight, we focus on
exploiting the data-level vulnerability variations and, specifically, the per-bit varia-
tions. Finally, out of all the areas we could apply the insight, we chose to apply it on a
hardware-level protection mechanism that operates, specifically, in a data cache.
In this section we explain our reasoning for limiting our exploitation investigation
into the aforementioned subset of the alternative exploitation options.
4.1. Exploitation Alternatives 67
























of a reliability mechanism operating at …
hardware level software level












Figure 4.1: Visualization of the alternative options to exploit the application behavior under
data corruption. Grayed boxes show our choice.
The characterization study in the previous chapter provided with detailed breakdowns
for all possible application behavior outcomes under data corruption. Throughout this
thesis, as the vulnerability factor of a hardware/software area we assumed the statistical
probability that a hardware fault occurring in that area would cause an SDC. There-
fore, we will focus on exploiting the variations of the reported SDC occurrences only.
Nevertheless, one could also exploit the distribution of the rest corruption outcomes
too, if the design target was to reduce their occurrences.
We opted to consider only the SDC distribution and protect only against SDCs
because they are the most severe corruption outcome. SDCs are the only execution
outcome that is undetectable online by any means and that does not provide any in-
dication that something happened out of the ordinary. All other corruption outcomes
(application crash, application stall, delayed correct execution) are observable and de-
tectable by conventional methods (e.g., software-visible symptom-based fault detec-
tion [50, 27, 37, 13, 8] monitors for suspicious behaviors/symptoms, such as violating
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likely program invariants, memory exceptions, cache misses, branch mispredictions,
fatal exceptions, program crashes, high OS activity, hangs).
Generally, the focus has always been on eliminating the occurrence of SDCs only.
Such related works that focus on increasing the dependability of systems consider
protection against SDCs only and assume special detection mechanisms for the rest
corruption outcomes. Moreover, the fault coverage of the proposed fault tolerant ap-
proaches is always experimentally evaluated in terms of the reported resulting SDC
occurrences only.
In the rest of this chapter the characterization insight will be exploited focusing on
areas less vulnerable to result into SDCs only.
The characterization study in the previous chapter essentially estimated vulnerability
factors for different hardware/software constructs for given workloads. As the vulnera-
bilities varied they provided a way to rank these constructs based on their vulnerability
and pointed out which areas are more or less likely to silently corrupt the output if a
hardware fault occurs there.
What we propose here is that it is unnecessary to protect everything equally and
exhaustively and, instead, we can exploit the vulnerability insight to our advantage by
shifting to vulnerability-driven unequal-protection mechanisms where the protec-
tion strength is assigned to hardware/software parts according to their vulnerability.
In the rest of this chapter the vulnerability insight will be exploited for the purposes
of shifting to vulnerability-driven unequal-protection mechanisms within a given struc-
ture or same-level structures.
It is intuitive how shifting to such a vulnerability-driven protection paradigm can be
beneficial compared to protecting everything equally and exhaustively. Interestingly,
a vulnerability-driven unequally-protected architecture may target different design ob-
jectives.
One promising way to exploit the vulnerability insight in a vulnerability-aware
manner is for reducing the cost of existing exhaustive fault-tolerant mechanisms. Com-
pared to an equally protected approach, we can reduce the reliability overheads in
a given structure by avoiding its exhaustive unnecessary protection with a minimum
impact on the total dependability by reducing the protection strength (and thus the cost
of protection) of the less-vulnerable parts only of the given structure.
Targeting reliability cost reduction is one of the design targets that vulnerability
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variations can be exploited for in vulnerability-driven protection mechanisms. An al-
ternative design target could be to improve the fault coverage at the same reliability
overhead as an equally-protected approach, by reducing the protection strength of the
less-vulnerable parts while increasing the protection strength of the more-vulnerable
parts. Such a design target is very relevant today for keeping up with the increasing
number of error rates that make exhaustive schemes invoke unsustainable costs.
Furthermore, vulnerability-driven protection could be used for trade-off purposes.
As our proposed class of vulnerability-aware fault-tolerant architectures can have vary-
ing fault-protection levels, it lends itself naturally to offer various degrees of reliability
QoS and trade off reliability against performance/cost. Similarly, it shows promise
for a gracefully degrading system that can still operate under a large number of errors
while offering a necessary (but reduced) set of services.
The characterization insight is not necessarily to be exploited for design-time pur-
poses. As mentioned throughout the previous chapter, there are various other areas
of exploiting the vulnerability variations. Alternative uses could be for reducing the
testing space during application dependability assessment by avoiding testing the less-
vulnerable application data, for reducing the testing space during reliability mechanism
dependability assessment, for guiding a reliability-aware software transformation, etc.
In the rest of this chapter the vulnerability insight will be exploited for the purposes
of reducing the cost of the reliability overheads within a given structure or same-level
structures.
One of the key features of our characterization study was that it operated at application
data level to observe the vulnerability variation between different data types (according
to their usage type). Contrary to existing works that investigated the vulnerability of
higher-level hardware structures and could only exploit their observations only for the
structures under consideration, we were able to investigate on the vulnerability varia-
tions of more areas than the one we injected faults in. As shown throughout the previ-
ous chapter, although our characterization framework operated on results by data-level
fault-injection experiments only, its data awareness allowed to extrapolate the reported
results to model the vulnerability of other areas too without the need to remodel and
repeat the fault-injection tests. As a result we were able to obtain the vulnerability
variations within the memory space, the register file and among instruction-level char-
acteristics.
Despite that, out of all the gained insight, we chose to exploit the application data
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related vulnerability variations (Section 3.3) and, in particular, the per-bit ones (Sec-
tion 3.3.1). As our study has been data-level aware it is more natural to focus on ex-
ploiting the application data vulnerabilities. More importantly, the per-bit data-level
variations show clear and consistent vulnerability variation patterns for given combi-
nations of data usage types and sizes; distinct bit ranges within application data can be
identified with distinct different vulnerability levels.
As this points out that application data are vulnerable in parts, it offers straight-
forward grounds to exploit that by protecting unequally the application data parts.
Moreover as this goes down to bit-level vulnerability estimation it can fine-tune the
unequal protection so that the potential benefits are maximized and, considering that
our suggested vulnerability-driven unequal-protection shift can offer various degrees
of reliability QoS, it can offer an even smoother trading off against reliability.
Most importantly, the per-bit data-related vulnerabilities show high-exploitability
characteristics. There are clear patterns, with high degrees of variation, that are con-
sistent among most applications. Moreover it is easy to unequally protect data words
(both in terms of identifying their types to drive the unequal protection and in terms of
implementing the unequal protection on them).
The rest observed vulnerability variations tended to not offer such clear insight
among different benchmarks. Nevertheless there is still ground for exploiting them in
a per application basis, as long as first the respective vulnerabilities are ranked before
exploiting them.
In the rest of this chapter only the per-bit data-type related vulnerability variations
will be exploited.
Depending on the level where error detection and error correction take place, reliabil-
ity mechanisms can be classified into hardware level, software level or a combination
of both. As vulnerability-driven unequal-protection is orthogonal to the specifics of a
reliability mechanism, the vulnerability insight can be exploited at any-level mecha-
nisms. E.g., a software-level mechanism that ensures reliability by instruction duplica-
tion can be adapted to duplicate only the instructions processing the more-vulnerable
data. Similarly, a hardware-level mechanism that ensures reliability by replicating
hardware structures can avoid duplicating parts of those that process less-vulnerable
data.
Equally interesting is applying vulnerability awareness to hardware/software co-
design reliability approaches. Such a shift offers more space for trading-off reliability
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QoS against performance/cost. Both the hardware and the software layer can become
aware of the error rates and exchange relevant information to ensure that the system
operation will always move forward in a gracefully degrading manner. In such co-
design approaches the hardware layer knowingly may not provide the illusion of fault-
free operation and let some faults propagate to the software layer, where the software
would be fault-aware to correct these in a way it sees fit.
Despite the choices made so far, vulnerability-driven unequal-protection may be
introduced to reduce the overhead costs of reliability mechanisms operating at any
level and protecting any area. In other words, the characterization insight can be ap-
plied orthogonally and exploited in many hardware/software areas. As we specifically
decided to exploit the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations, it is more fitting to do
so in the case of a hardware-level protection mechanism operating in a data cache.
Out of the possible hardware areas that require protection against faults, this chosen
insight is more natural to be exploited in data-holding structures in general (i.e., main
memory, data caches, registers, etc.) and not necessarily only in data caches. Never-
theless, as mentioned before, due to the data-level awareness of the experiments, our
insight can be extrapolated to be applied in other non data-holding structures (i.e., arith-
metic/logical operations, communication wires, etc.). Moreover, data-holding struc-
tures are more susceptible to transient hardware faults due to their increasing relative
size and due to their constant exposure to faults compared to logic that is exposed only
when it is actively computing a result [29]. As expected the extra cost of constant full
protection is also relatively higher and along with data caches being a performance
bottleneck, research on decreasing the data cache reliability overhead is more relevant.
Equally important is that exploiting the per-bit data-level vulnerabilities shows
more high exploitability potential in data caches than other data-holding structures.
Exploiting that application data are vulnerable in parts depending on their usage type
is more straightforward in the case of an vulnerability-aware unequally-protected data
cache compared to a similar main memory. Determining the data types as they are
being accessed and assigning their vulnerabilities in a data cache is easier, compared
to the main memory, where data reside before being first used and thus before identi-
fying their types. Similarly, if we were to exploit the data-level vulnerabilities in an
unequally-protected register file, the potential savings will be relatively small as the
less vulnerable data wouldn’t occupy specific registers nor a large set of them con-
stantly. Moreover, as it will be established in the next section, the most consistent
per-bit insight for the tested applications (the clear vulnerability variations among FP
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data) is highly exploitable in a data cache as it is occupied by it in large volumes during
large application execution intervals.
In the rest of this chapter the vulnerability insight will be exploited only for the
case of a hardware-level mechanism protecting a data cache.
4.1.1 Identifying Areas of High Exploitability Potential
Throughout this section a variety of alternatives to exploit the vulnerability insight was
discussed. The abundance of options is mostly enabled by the fact that (a) we obtained
vulnerability variations at different levels and (b) that unequal protection can be ap-
plied orthogonally to many areas regardless of the specifics of the original reliability
mechanism (i.e., their protection method, the component they protect, their level of
operation or their design goal).
All exploitation alternatives do not share the same magnitude of potential benefits.
Here we suggest what characteristics are desired to identify promising areas of high
exploitability potential to maximize the benefits of exploiting the application behav-
ior insight by introducing vulnerability-aware unequal protection and how our chosen
exploitation alternative satisfies these properties.
Generally, the exploitability potential depends on which observed vulnerability insight
is to be exploited and where the vulnerability-aware unequal protection is to be intro-
duced. To maximize the potential benefits the following characteristics are desired:
• Regarding the vulnerability insight to be exploited, it is desired that it offers:
(a) clear and distinct vulnerability patterns,
(b) that are consistent across different workloads, and
(c) that their vulnerability intensity levels are different by high degrees. This
is because high vulnerability variation between the less and more vulnera-
ble areas offers more potential benefits compared to constant vulnerability
throughout all areas.
• Regarding the location where the vulnerability-aware unequal protection is to be
introduced, it is desired that:
(a) it is easy and low cost to assign the protection strength based on the vul-
nerabilities; in other words, identifying the vulnerabilities of the different
parts must be easy and low cost to occur online during execution, and
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(b) it must be possible to introduce unequal protection at the area under pro-
tection without much overhead; in other words, the existing mechanisms
must be naturally adaptable to unequal protection.
• Regarding the synergy of both of the above, for a vulnerability pattern under
exploitation in the chosen area, the volume/timeshare that the varying vulnera-
bility pattern is present in the chosen area must be large enough to maximize
the benefits and to warrant the effort of introducing vulnerability-aware unequal
protection there.
Out of all the available vulnerability insight and potential exploitation areas, we de-
cided to exploit the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations of the NPB-serial bench-
marks to reduce the reliability-overhead costs in a reduced-cost vulnerability-driven
unequally-protected data cache. This chosen exploitation alternative shows all high
exploitability characteristics.
In particular, regarding the per-bit data-level vulnerability insight for NPB-serial
(Section 3.3.1): (a) It showed clear and distinct vulnerability patterns among different
bit ranges of most data types, where the bit ranges that are less vulnerable are either at
the MSBs or LSBs of application data. (b) It showed consistent vulnerability variation
among most of the different workloads. (c) The observed vulnerability patterns have
different vulnerability intensity levels; the less-vulnerable bit ranges have almost zero
vulnerability factors, while the more-vulnerable are significantly more vulnerable.
Regarding introducing vulnerability-aware unequal protection in a data cache: (a)
As the per-bit vulnerabilities are determined by the data type and as most data types can
be identified at access time, it is possible to set the vulnerabilities of the cache contents
at access time during execution to drive the vulnerability-aware mechanism online. (b)
As the data cache is a data-holding structure, the available data protection mechanisms
(e.g., ECC) can naturally be adapted to support unequal data word protection.
Regarding the volume/timeshare that the most exploitable per-bit data-level vulner-
ability patterns occupy the data cache: The most promising per-bit data-level vulner-
ability pattern is the one for FP data because they show clear, consistent and distinct
patterns. Due to the FP-heavy nature of the NPB-serial benchmarks, we expect that the
data cache will be heavily occupied by FP data during large application execution in-
tervals. Therefore there is high exploitation potential in unequally protecting FP data in
a data cache. Although we expect that not all data types will experience high volumes
in the data cache (and thus not experience all high exploitability characteristics), those
that will are looking very promising, even if they are the only ones to be exploited.
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Generally, we expect that the potential benefits will be substantial and can be maxi-
mized when unequally protecting application data in a data cache.
As the per-bit data-level vulnerability insight for NPB-serial showed, there are wide
and continuous bit ranges within specific application data with near-zero probability
to result into an SDC. E.g., each of the 32 LSBs of FPs in CG have less than 1%
probability to cause an SDC if corrupted. Similar near-zero probability is experienced
for up to 49 MSBs of 8-byte IPs, for up to 41 MSBs of 8-byte PTRs, for up to 39 MSBs
of 8-byte PTRMRs and PTRTPs (excluding CG), etc.
This points out that only parts of data need to be protected strongly against faults.
E.g., only 50% of the full width of FPs in CG, 24% of 8-byte IPs, 36% of 8-byte PTRs,
40% of 8-byte PTRMRs and PTRTPs (excluding CG) needs to be protected strongly
against faults. If the rest non-vulnerable bit ranges are not as strongly protected as
the more vulnerable ones, the expected fault coverage per dataword of these types will
almost not drop at all.
When taking into account the volume of the data types in a data cache, generally we
expect that the strongly protected surface reduction can be maximized when exploiting
the per-bit data-level vulnerabilities. E.g., as NPB-serial is FP heavy, we expect that
the data cache will be largely occupied by FPs. Assuming an average occupancy rate
of X% of FPs in a data cache running CG, then 0.5 ∗X% of the data cache can be
protected not-strongly to an almost zero drop of the fault coverage of FPs. Therefore
we can reduce the total strongly-protected surface to a minimum effect on the fault
coverage to reduce the reliability overheads in a cache.
The potential benefits of our chosen exploitation alternative depend on the volume
that the data types occupy the data cache. In the next section we will profile the con-
tents of a data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks in order to obtain the vol-
ume/timeshare of data types within the data cache. This will further show how the
chosen exploitation alternative experiences all high exploitability characteristics and
how this can translate into potential benefits in terms of strongly-protected surface
reduction.
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4.2 Data Cache Content Profiling
To move forward with our exploitation investigation we require a method for data
cache content profiling to obtain the volume/timeshare of data types within a data
cache during the execution of an application. Such information is needed (a) to reaffirm
that our chosen exploitation alternative (of per-bit data-level vulnerabilities in a data
cache) experiences all high exploitability characteristics (see previous section) and (b)
to measure the maximum potential benefits of our chosen exploitation alternative (see
next section).
In this section, first, we describe our data cache content profiler. Its purpose is to
simulate a data cache in order to obtain the occupancy rates of the data types within
the data cache during the execution of an application. Then, after setting up our ex-
periments, we profile the contents of various data cache configurations executing the
NPB-serial benchmarks to obtain the required information.
4.2.1 Data Cache Content Profiler
Overview: For a given application binary and a cache configuration, the data cache
content profiler instruments the application to capture every memory access (both loads
and stores) and to simulate them in the data cache. The cache content profiler requires
one instrumented run of the application for each different cache configuration.
For every memory access, it classifies the accessed data in different usage types,
according to their use by the application. The usage type classification logic is the
same as the one used by the single-fault injection tool1.
Then, all classified memory accesses are simulated in order by a data cache simu-
lator. On top of traditional cache simulators, it keeps track of the data type that each of
the cache bytes is occupied by. This enables to obtain the occupancy rates of the data
types within the data cache during the execution of the given application.
Data usage type classification: Classifying the usage type of the accessed data can
be either immediate at access time or it may require tracking the data through the
execution until a first meaningful use (as detailed in Subsection 2.2.3). As the cache
content profiler requires one run of the application, there may be multiple accessed
1Given the reasons we require data cache content profiling, the profiler has to be compatible with the
performed vulnerability characterization, thus it must classify the contents using the same classification
algorithm as the characterization framework (see Subsection 2.2.3 and Fig. 2.2).
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data being tracked concurrently but at separate tracking processes.
To manage the multiple data tracking processes we use a queue. This queue keeps
an in order history of the memory accesses and may include both classified and not-yet
classified memory accesses. Each element in the queue is independent of each other.
There are separate data structures used for implementing the independent data tracking
and dynamic taint tracking logic; each queue entry holds all the necessary propagation
information for its own purposes, i.e., load/store, initial memory address, initial regis-
ter, tainted registers, tainted memory locations, instruction tracking window, etc.
Once a new memory access is captured, it is added to the queue. If its data usage
type can be classified immediately, it is flagged accordingly. Otherwise, the classi-
fication process is set up and all relevant information for data tracking purposes are
added to the new queue element. If it is a load access, this includes the original loaded
memory location and the first register to store the loaded data. If it is a store access,
this includes only the original stored memory location.
Then, for every instrumented instruction and for every non-classified memory ac-
cess data type, the classification proceeds independently of the rest ongoing classifica-
tions processes; the data tracking and/or the dynamic taint tracking proceeds for each
memory access according to the classification logic. Once a memory access data type
is classified, the relevant queue entry is updated.
The logic and process to detect the types by data tracking is the same as in the
single-fault injection tool. A separate case holds for classifying the usage types of data
accessed by memory stores. When storing data in memory there is no indication how
the data have been used so far by the application. An exception holds if they were
stored in memory using one of the special registers as an input register and then we
can classify them immediately, e.g., a store using an FP register as an input can be
classified as accessing FP data. Otherwise, to classify the originally stored data, we
will have to wait for them to be accessed again by a subsequent memory load access
and then invoke the classification process.
Queue management: To ensure the correctness of the forthcoming simulation we
use the aforementioned queue. To simulate a memory access by the cache simulator,
its usage data type must have been classified. Also, the memory accesses must be
simulated in the correct order. The queue, apart from enabling the concurrent data
tracking processes, keeps an in order history of the memory accesses to feed them in
order to the cache simulator.
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As data usage type classification is not always immediate and does not take the
same time to detect, the queue may include both classified and not-yet classified mem-
ory access data types; some elements in the queue may not be classified yet but more
recent ones may be.
For every instrumented instruction we attempt to empty the queue. All classified
memory accesses at the head of the queue are removed from the queue, until the head
of the queue is occupied by a not-yet classified memory access. Those that are success-
fully removed from the head of the queue are passed to the cache simulator to simulate
a memory access (load or store) at a memory address that is of a specific size in bytes
and that holds data of a classified usage type.
If the head of the queue remains unclassified for large execution intervals, the queue
size may quickly become unmanageable. To avoid an explosion of the queue size, we
impose (a) a time limit (in instructions) for the classification process by data tracking2,
and (b) a time limit (in instructions) for waiting for a non-classified memory store
location to be accessed again by a memory load3.
Fig. 4.2 shows an example of how the queue is populated over time to perform con-
current different data usage type classification processes on different memory accesses
and how the queue is emptied to pass the classified memory accesses to the cache
simulator.
Data cache simulator: The classified memory accesses that are removed from the
head of the queue are passed in order to the cache simulator. The passed information
include the access type (load or store), the memory access address, the accessed data
size (in bytes) and the accessed data usage type.
The simulator is a traditional cache simulator that, on top of the usual ones, it keeps
track of the cache content data types at byte granularity. For every cache byte, it stores
the usage type of the data that occupy that byte and the full byte range that the data
in that byte occupy. E.g., assuming an 8-byte FP stored in memory at bytes 0x10 up
2As in the single-fault injection tool, an instruction window of 1000 instructions is set as a time
limit to classify the tracked data’s usage type. If the time limit is reached, their usage type is reported
as INT. Due to this time limit, data that may have otherwise classified as other usage types, are forced
to be classified as INT. An implication of that is that the percentage of INT data may increase and
include a mix of other types too, while the rest reported data usage types contain exactly the correctly
identified types. Nevertheless, the exploitation potential benefits presented in the rest of this chapter still
hold, especially as this classification behavior was present also during the vulnerability characterization
framework.
3Memory stores that are not immediately classified cannot be tracked to determine their usage type
until accessed again by a subsequent memory load. If this doesn’t occur within an instruction window
of 1000 instructions, then the store access is reported as UNUSEDSTORE.



































































































   ...
1: load (0xA, 4B, R1)
   ...
2: store(0xB, 4B, R2)
   ...
3: load (0xC, 8B, R3)
   ...
4: load (0xB, 4B, R4)
   ...
5: load (0xD, 1B, R5)









Figure 4.2: Example management of concurrent usage type classification for in-order data
cache content profiling.
(A) Each memory access is added to the queue. If classified immediately, it is flagged accord-
ingly. Otherwise, the necessary information to start the data tracking are added. Memory
access 1 requires data tracking, thus a classification process is setup to start on the accessed
memory address (0xA) and the first register loaded (R1). Memory address 2 is a store access
and will have to wait until the accessed memory address (0xB) is loaded by a subsequent ac-
cess (memory access 4), thus the classification process waits until memory access 4. Memory
access 3 is loaded into an FP register and can be classified immediately.
(B) Over time all unclassified accesses go through their respective classification process. The
figure shows the changes over time and not per individual instrumented instruction. When
the head of the queue is populated by one or more classified accesses, these are removed and
passed in order as cache accesses to the type-aware cache simulator.
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to 0x17 and loaded into the cache, all simulated cache bytes representing 0x10 up to
0x17 are marked as storing an FP that spans from 0x10 up to 0x17.
For every cache access (both hits and misses), the exact cache bytes that are ac-
cessed are always updated to the usage type of the newly accessed data, even in the
case of load hits. As we care about usage type profiling, the cache content type infor-
mation must remain always up to date and reflect the most recent usage of the data.
E.g., assuming a cache hit of an 8-byte IP stored in memory at bytes 0x10 up to 0x17,
even though it is a cache hit, all simulated cache bytes representing 0x10 up to 0x17
are changed (from the aforementioned FP) to be marked as storing an IP that spans
from 0x10 up to 0x17.
On a similar note, when a cache access causes the change of a cache byte usage
type, all neighboring bytes that were part of the old value must have their usage type
invalidated. E.g., assuming a cache hit of a 1-byte INT stored in memory at 0x14, the
simulated cache byte representing 0x14 is changed (from the aforementioned IP data
stored between 0x10 and 0x17) to be marked as storing a 1-byte INT and (because the
original IP data are no longer valid) the type of the cache bytes representing 0x10-0x13
and 0x15-0x17 is invalidated.
Finally, due to classifying data types according to their use by the application, the
simulated usage types are known only after the data are used. Therefore, in cache
misses that cause a new cache line to be loaded into the cache, we have no way of
knowing the data types of the full cache line, apart from the bytes that were actively
accessed by the application. As a result, the profiled cache contents show a live image
of the types accessed so far by the application and not an indication of future accessed
types.
Reported occupancy rates: Every time a cache byte type is changed there are relevant
counters that are updated accordingly. These counter provide a live image of exactly
how many cache bytes are occupied by any combination of usage types and sizes. The
data cache content profiler uses these counters to report the occupancy rates of the data
types within the data cache during the execution of the given application.
4.2.2 Experimental Setup and Profiling Results
The data cache content profiler was implemented as a set of dynamic binary instru-
mentation Pin tools [28] reusing the usage type classification logic of the single-fault
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injection tool (as detailed in Subsection 2.2.3). Given the reasons behind the data cache
content profiling, the profiling results must be compatible to the performed vulnerabil-
ity characterization. Therefore we profiled the data cache contents when executing
the same benchmark binaries as the ones we have already obtained the vulnerability
insight for.
The contents of twelve different-sized cache configurations were profiled while
executing the full set of the ten workloads of the NAS Parallel Benchmarks [10] (64-bit,
NPB-serial, version 3.3.1, input class size S, gcc 4.4.6 -o3, Linux kernel 2.6.32). The
data caches were 4-set associative with a 32-byte block size and their size varied from
1K up to 2048K. To perform the cache content profiling one run of each application
was instrumented for each different cache size.
Given the data cache content profiler design, the results effectively depict the data
occupancy rates in an L1 cache. Focusing on L1 caches and reducing the reliability
costs at that level is more imperative in terms of cost and performance than in lower
level caches. Although we profiled up to 2048K-sized caches, that are unreasonable to
be used as L1 caches, these results still give an insight on how the larger lower level
caches would be occupied by data types.
Fig. 4.3 shows the data cache content profiling results for the CG benchmark for each
profiled cache size. It can be seen that, throughout the execution, there are data types
(FP and PTRTP data in the case of CG) that dominate the data cache in large volumes.
Similar behavior is exhibited in the rest tested benchmarks4; there are data types
that occupy the data cache in high volumes and during large execution intervals. This
holds especially true for the case of FP data. For most of the rest tested benchmarks,
except DC and IS that are not FP heavy, there are high occupancy rates of FP data in
the data cache (irrespective of its size) throughout the execution.
What varies among the profiled data caches and benchmarks is the magnitude of
the occupancy rates. Fig. 4.4 shows the breakdown of the data cache contents ac-
cording to their usage type for all NPB-serial benchmarks. These results are averaged
occupancy rates exhibited in each profiled cache size over the full execution of each
benchmark. This averaged breakdown of occupancy rates reaffirms that there are data
types (especially the FP data) that reside in large volumes in the data cache, regardless
of the cache size, during the lifetime of most profiled applications. As these are the
4For space reasons, the profiled data cache contents over the execution time are shown only for one
of the ten profiled NPB-serial benchmarks.
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data types that we intend to exploit their vulnerabilities, the profiling results motivate
that the potential benefits will be substantial.
As it appears that our chosen exploitation alternative satisfies all high exploitability
characteristics, we can move forward on measuring the maximum potential benefits.
In the next section we use the obtained occupancy rates to estimate the potential ben-
efits of exploiting the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations of NPB-serial in a
vulnerability-aware unequally-protected data cache.
4.3 Per-Bit Data-Level Vulnerability Exploitation
Benefits in a Data Cache
In this section we show the maximum potential benefits of our chosen exploitation
alternative. In particular, we will exploit the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations
of NPB-serial targeting the reliability-overheads reduction in a vulnerability-aware
unequally-protected data cache that offers two levels of fault-protection strength while
running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
As mentioned throughout this chapter and further established by the data cache
content profiling, we expect that exploiting the characterization insight in that particu-
lar vulnerability-driven manner will have significant potential cost-saving benefits, es-
pecially as it indeed experiences all high-exploitability characteristics (Section 4.1.1).
The potential reliability-overhead benefits will be measured in terms of strongly-
protected surface reduction against to what effect on the fault coverage to enable
trading-off the reliability overheads against the reliability QoS level.
To estimate these potential benefits (for the case of the data cache running the NPB-
serial) we only require (a) the observed per-bit data-level vulnerability variations of
the NPB-serial benchmarks obtained during the characterization study (Section 3.3.1)
and (b) the observed occupancy rates of data types in a cache executing the NPB-
serial benchmarks obtained by the data cache content profiling (Section 4.2). As ex-
plained later, this limit study does not require an exact design for a vulnerability-aware
unequally-protected cache; an assumed optimal cache design suffices.
As we exploit the per-bit data-level vulnerability insight, the trade-offs will be inves-
tigated at application data level granularity per particular combinations of data usage
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types (D) and data sizes (B bytes, b bits), while fine-tuning their unequal protection at
bit granularity.
More precisely, we will introduce the unequal protection per particular combina-
tions of D-B data, where their full bit range will be protected against N hardware faults
and b− l bits will be protected stronger against one extra hardware fault. This enables
to show how varying the amount of bits under stronger protection (b− l, l ∈ [0,b])
affects the fault coverage5 of D-B data against N + 1 faults occurring randomly over
the b bits of D-B data. Meanwhile, we will show how the variations of l for the par-
ticular combination of D-B data translates to benefits on the full data cache in terms of
strongly-protected surface reduction.
Therefore, the trade-offs we observe are between the fault coverage of particular
D-B data against the potential benefits in the full cache. Investigating the effects on
fault coverage at application data level (per combinations of D-B data) and not in
higher granularities (e.g., cache line, full cache), makes it clear to see how varying the
protection of D-B data affects their fault coverage to what benefits to the full cache.
If we had investigated the fault coverage variations at a higher level, although (a)
the unequal protection would still be per D-B data and (b) the benefits would still be
the same, the effects of exploiting the D-B data vulnerabilities (by varying the unequal
protection) on fault coverage would not be seen clearly. This is mainly due to the
methods for measuring the theoretical fault coverage that involve the probability that a
single hardware fault occurs in one out of the many cache bits. Due to the cache sizes,
this probability is small enough that makes the fault coverage changes minimal and
hard to see.
The potential benefits will be estimated for the case of a 64K data cache (4-set asso-
ciative, 32B block size). Out of the 12 profiled cache configurations (Section 4.2) we
show the exploitation potential in the 64K data cache only, as it is a typical size for an
L1 cache where any improvements in cost and performance are more imperative than
lower level caches. Moreover, the 64K-sized configuration experienced the most in-
stances of highest occupancy rates of FP data over the profiled benchmarks (Fig. 4.4).
Nevertheless, despite selecting the 64K-sized configuration, similar analysis can be
performed for the rest cache configurations.
Table 4.1 shows the data occupancy rates in a 64K sized data cache running the
5As the fault coverage (of an area protected by a reliability mechanism against a number of occur-
ring hardware faults) we define the probability that, if the number of faults occurs in this given area, an
SDC will not occur.
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Table 4.1: Average occupancy rates (as percentages of the total cache area) per profiled bench-
mark for different combinations of data usage types and data sizes that reside in a 64K data
cache executing NPB-serial. Rates obtained by the data cache content profiler (Section 4.2).
AVERAGE OCCUPANCY RATES (%) IN A 64K DATA CACHE (4-SET ASSOCIATIVE, 32B BLOCK SIZE)
EXECUTING NPB-SERIAL (3.3.1, INPUT CLASS S)
type: FP IP PTR PTRTP INT UnusedStore
size: 8 16 any 8 4 8 16 any 4 8 any 4 8 any 4 8 16 any
BT 72.95 0.02 72.97 0.09 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.73 0.83 0.00 16.58 0.02 16.60
CG 60.42 0.03 60.45 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 24.65 0.11 24.76 3.45 0.34 3.81 0.91 4.51 1.79 7.21
DC 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.09 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.79 0.00 16.61 16.62 1.10 10.18 11.99 0.59 37.85 1.37 41.70
EP 90.64 0.02 90.66 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 2.10 2.10 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.00 4.93 0.01 4.94
FT 36.04 0.00 36.04 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.22 7.77 7.99 0.00 53.07 0.00 53.07
IS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 69.18 0.10 69.28 3.07 0.38 3.50 20.93 0.12 0.65 21.70
LU 51.54 0.04 51.58 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.25 0.27 0.19 3.41 3.62 0.00 39.03 0.01 39.04
MG 59.46 0.00 59.46 0.07 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.42 0.01 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.84 1.07 0.01 31.76 3.34 35.11
SP 51.71 0.01 51.72 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.09 5.82 5.91 0.00 32.41 0.07 32.48
UA 42.41 0.03 42.44 0.05 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.80 7.37 0.05 7.42 0.71 1.35 2.06 0.11 34.36 6.71 41.18
NPB-serial benchmarks, as obtained from the data cache content profiler. Each rate
shows the average percentage of the total cache area that was occupied by a specific
data type of a particular size6. Not all cache occupancy rates for any combination of
data types and sizes are shown. Although the occupancy rates were obtained for all
combinations, only a subset of those will be exploited here as many of them were very
low for significant benefits.
This limit study does not require an exact data cache design to measure the intended po-
tential benefits. It only needs the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations and the data
cache occupancy rates. Therefore, we can assume an available optimal vulnerability-
aware unequally-protected data cache design that (a) can offer two levels of fault-
protection strength that can be fine-tuned at bit granularity to unequally protect the
cache contents at data-level granularity and (b) can detect the vulnerability of cache
data to drive their unequal protection according to their expected vulnerabilities. Al-
though assuming an optimal cache design assists into estimating the maximum poten-
tial benefits of introducing vulnerability-aware unequal protection in a data cache, it is
6Note that during the data cache content profiling (Section 4.2) we showed the total occupancy rates
per data type of any size. Here we will use the occupancy rates per data type for particular data sizes
to ensure compatibility with the respective per-bit vulnerability observations to estimate correctly the
trade-offs.
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an indication too of the limited practicality of the proposed approach as we will discuss
in the end of this chapter.
4.3.1 Strongly-Protected Surface Trade-Offs
Against Fault Coverage
In this subsection we demonstrate the potential exploitability of our characterization
findings in a generic design of a fault-tolerant data cache running the NPB-serial
benchmarks. Assuming a vulnerability-aware unequal protection mechanism we an-
swer the question of how much we can exploit the vulnerability characteristics of appli-
cation data to reduce the strongly-protected surface of a data cache and to what effect
on the reliability QoS level.
Introduction: The characterization study (Chapter 3) uncovered a variety of vulnera-
bility characterization observations that we could exploit in our case of an unequally-
protected data cache. Starting at higher application-level granularity, we showed the
percentages of tests per application that led to SDCs (Fig. 3.1) and we can exploit this
in a naive way by strongly protecting only that percentage of data cache contents, when
the respective application is executing, agnostic to their independent vulnerabilities.
This, however, would not be effective without knowing how to match the less-
protected portion of the cache to the less-vulnerable portion of the application’s data.
Instead unequal protection driven by the finer vulnerability classification of application
data according to their attributes (Fig. 3.2-3.5) is more promising and accurate given
that we can rank application data per application according to their vulnerabilities and
protect stronger only the more-vulnerable data types in the data cache.
More interesting room for exploitation is in the per-bit vulnerability variations
within application data (Fig. 3.7-3.14) as these exhibit the high-exploitability charac-
teristics. Moreover, as these results can drive a bit-level finer-grained unequal protec-
tion, they allow for the maximum possible reduction of the strongly-protected surface
to the minimum possible impact on the fault coverage.
Assumed cache design, protection and operation: Before measuring the fault cov-
erage against the strongly-protected surface reduction, we assume a data cache that is
equipped with a protection mechanism that can assign different protection at different
cache contents at data granularity. This protection mechanism can offer two levels of
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fault-protection strength that can be fine-tuned at bit-level granularity to protect the
application data bits unequally. All bits of application data are protected against N
faults (weaker protection strength), while some bits of some application data can be
protected against one extra fault (stronger protection strength). Because our obtained
vulnerability insight is for single-bit data corruption effects, in order to show the ex-
ploitability potential, we had to define the stronger protection as protecting against one
extra hardware fault compared to the weaker protection.
The extra protected bits are protected by the stronger-protection level and the total
of them constitutes what we call strongly-protected cache surface. When the strongly-
protected surface covers the full cache, this narrows down to the fully equally protected
data cache that protects every application data against N+1 faults and that we compare
against. When there is no strongly-protected surface, this narrows down to a fully
weakly-protected data cache that protects every application data against N faults and
that exhibits the maximum potential benefits as it assumes that all contents are less
vulnerable. When N = 0, the weakly-protected surface does not protect the area it
covers.
In this trade-off analysis in terms of strongly-protected surface reduction, the exact
value of N is irrelevant. The trade-off observations still hold for the case of stronger
unequal protection against any number of N faults per protected application data. This
motivates a strongly-protected surface reduction even when the more-vulnerable data
are protected even stronger (or even have more than two protection-strength levels).
Similarly, the details on how exactly the protection mechanism is implemented
are irrelevant for measuring the strongly-protected surface reduction. All we require
is that the assumed protection mechanism can support the aforementioned behavior.
Moreover, we assume the data cache has the mechanisms to detect the vulnerability
of its data to drive their unequal protection accordingly. Once more, to measure the
intended potential benefits, the related design choices and implementation details are
irrelevant. E.g., how the vulnerability of data is detected, how the mapping is done
of vulnerable data to stronger protected regions, how the cache is partitioned in two
parts with different protection levels and to what effect on the other cache performance
metrics, such as cache hit/miss rates, etc.
Fault coverage: As the fault coverage (of an area protected by a reliability mechanism
against a number of occurring hardware faults) we define the probability that, if the
number of faults occurs in the given area, an SDC will not occur.
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To formulate this in the case of the assumed unequal-protection mechanism: The
fault coverage FCD,B,L (of a data type D of size B bytes when all of its b bits are
protected against N faults and b− l of its bits are protected against one extra hardware
fault, where L is a set of l ∈ [0,b] bits) is the probability that, if N + 1 faults occur
within the D-B data’s b bits, an SDC will not occur.
Because all b bits are protected against N faults, the first N faults will not cause
an SDC. As each occurring fault is an independent event, FCD,B,L narrows down to
the probability that the N + 1 fault will not cause an SDC. This is equivalent to the
inverse probability of the N + 1 fault causing an SDC. The probability of the N + 1
fault causing an SDC is the sum of the probabilities that the N +1 fault occurs in a not







The VFD,B,i is the observed statistical probability that a corruption in the bit i ∈
[0,b− 1] of data of usage type D and size B bytes (b bits) will result into an SDC.
V FD,B,i is obtained by the results of the per-bit data-level vulnerability study that es-
sentially provided statistical experimental vulnerability factors for each bit of each
combination of data usage types and data sizes.
Trade-off results: Fig. 4.5-4.9 show the reduction of the strongly-protected cache
surface against the reduction of the fault coverage of data, when we decide not to
protect strongly an amount of LSBs (or MSBs) of the data. Each figure is for a specific
combination of data usage type and data size.
These point out how much we can exploit the different vulnerabilities of different
bit ranges within application data to reduce the strongly-protected surface of the 64K
data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks to what effect on the fault coverage.
The differences between the shown trade-off curves are because the vulnerability char-
acteristics and the rates that the specified application data types occur in the data cache
vary among the tested benchmarks.
To obtain the trade-offs shown in Fig. 4.5-4.9, for each combination of application
data usage types (D) and data sizes (B), we progressively reduce the protection of D-B
data by reducing their bit range under strong protection by 1 bit, until the strong pro-
tection has been removed from the full data bit range. Due to the per-bit vulnerability
insight that showed less-vulnerable bit ranges either at LSBs or MSBs of application
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Figure 4.5: Trading-off fault coverage of FP (8 byte) data against the strongly-protected sur-
face reduction (by excepting the FP (8 Byte) LSBs from the strongly-protected surface) of a
64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
data, we reduce the bit range under strong protection by 1 bit in continuous bit ranges
starting at the LSB or MSB (depending on the D-B combination).
Every time the bit range under strong protection of D-B data is reduced, we ex-
trapolate this to the expected total reduction of strongly-protected surface of the data
cache. As we know the average occupancy rate of D-B data in the data cache and their
individual size (D), it is trivial to estimate the total reduction of strongly-protected sur-
face of the data cache every time we reduce the protection by one bit in every D-B data.
Thus, the total possible reduction of strongly-protected cache surface, when unequally
protecting D-B data, is bounded by the occupancy rate of D-B data in the data cache.
The progressive reduction of the strongly-protected surface can be seen in the figures
when moving towards right on the curves.
To simplify the calculation of the strongly-protected cache surface reduction we
used the average occupancy rates of D-B data. This implies an assumption that each
combination of D-B data occupies the data cache in a constant rate over the execution.
Although this is not what happens in reality, our assumption stands correct in a valid
cache design that could force specific D-B data to occupy specific optimally-sized
partitions of the data cache (whose sizes are decided by the occupancy rates) at the
cost of possibly increased cache miss rates.
As for the expected fault coverage, each figure shows the expected drop in fault
coverage for a specific combination of D-B for the same progressive reduction of their
bit ranges under strong protection by one more bit at a time. We computed the fault
coverage as discussed before for increasing widths of less-protected bit ranges. Note
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Figure 4.6: Trading-off fault coverage of INT (8 byte) data against the strongly-protected
surface reduction (by excepting the INT (8 Byte) LSBs from the strongly-protected surface) of
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Figure 4.7: Trading-off fault coverage of PTR (8 byte) data against the strongly-protected
surface reduction (by excepting the PTR (8 Byte) MSBs from the strongly-protected surface) of
a 64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
that the estimated fault coverage is estimated for a single D-B data of a given bench-
mark, and not the full data cache fault coverage, based on the per-bit data-level vul-
nerability insight. As expected, when reducing the bit range under strong protection of
D-B data, the fault coverage of single D-B data in the cache reduces. This can be seen
in the figures when moving towards right on the curves.
As an example, in Fig. 4.5, when protecting strongly all bits of FP-8B data of EP
(leftmost point), the fault coverage of FP-8B is 100% and the strongly-protected cache
surface does not reduce (0% reduction). When progressively reducing the strongly-
protected bit range of FP-8B data in EP by removing one LSB at the time, we move
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Figure 4.8: Trading-off fault coverage of PTRTP (8 byte) data against the strongly-protected
surface reduction (by excepting the PTRTP (8 Byte) MSBs from the strongly-protected surface)
of a 64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
right on the curve until the full FP-8B are not strongly protected (rightmost point of
the EP curve). When the full FP-8B in EP are not strongly protected, as the occupancy
rate of FP-8B data in the 64K data cache is 90.64%, the expected strongly-protected
surface reduction is also 90.64%. As for the expected fault coverage of FP-8B data
in EP, when not protecting their full bit range strongly, it drops to 91.20%. This is
obtained by the aforementioned fault coverage calculation method based on the per-bit
vulnerability factors observed for the FP-8B data in EP.
Discussion: Out of all the estimated trade-offs, we observe the best trade-offs when
unequally protecting floating-point data (FP-8B, Fig. 4.5). As most NPB-serial bench-
marks are FP-heavy (except DC and IS), along with the clear per-bit vulnerability
patterns of FP data (Fig. 3.7), we can avoid protecting the LSBs of FPs to a greatly
reduced total fault-protected surface with a minimal impact on fault coverage. For
example, the total fault-protected surface of the data cache under consideration can
be reduced by 15% (for 8 out of 10 benchmarks) compared to a fully-protected data
cache without affecting the fault coverage of single FP data. If this is to be decided per
benchmark, the surface reduction can reach up to 41% (for EP) with a less than 0.01%
drop in the fault coverage of its FPs, where 29 LSBs of each FP are not protected in
the data cache that is 90.64% occupied on average by FP data during execution of EP.
Furthermore, for a set reliability level we can now reduce the fault-protected sur-
face compared to a fully-protected data cache. For example, the fault-protected surface
may be reduced up to 91% (for EP) when not protecting at all the FPs, while the ex-

























































































Figure 4.9: Trading-off fault coverage of PTRTP (4 byte) data against the strongly-protected
surface reduction (by excepting the PTRTP (4 Byte) MSBs from the strongly-protected surface)
of a 64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
pected fault coverage for a single FP drops to 90%. The fault coverage, as we defined
it per single live data, measures the probability of an SDC caused by a corrupted FP
given a fault in a cache location with live FP contents. In reality the probability of an
SDC given a fault in a cache location containing a live FP is much smaller but it is not
shown as it would obscure the effects of unequal protection on single data.
The same trade-offs are observed for other application data types (INT-8B, PTR-
8B, PTRTP-8B, PTRTP-4B) and are shown in Fig. 4.6-4.9 respectively. Despite the
fact that these types have clear per-bit vulnerability patterns too, due to their smaller
volume in the data cache, avoiding protecting their less-vulnerable bit ranges does not
invoke such significant fault-protected surface reduction (except a few limited cases)
as it was the case for the FP data. Generally, the vulnerability-driven fault-protected
surface reduction is bounded by the average amount of the specific application data
types in the data cache for a given benchmark. Nevertheless, unequal protection can be
introduced to these types too to add their individual effects for a greater fault-protected
surface reduction.
So far, we showed how to exploit the vulnerability characteristics of only specific
data types that had clear vulnerability patterns. The same could be done for the re-
maining data types to further increase the benefits of bit-level unequal protection to
the extra cost of identifying all other data types and exploiting them, e.g., by rank-
ing bits of application data based on their per-bit vulnerabilities and reshuffling them
accordingly to form less-vulnerable bit ranges.
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Table 4.2: Average rates of ‘unused’ cache contents/space (as percentages of the total cache
area) per profiled benchmark in a 64K data cache executing NPB-serial. Rates obtained by the
data cache content profiler (Section 4.2).
AVERAGE UNUSED STORES/SPACE RATES (%)
IN A 64K DATA CACHE (4-SET ASSOCIATIVE, 32B BLOCK SIZE)
EXECUTING NPB-SERIAL (3.3.1, INPUT CLASS S)
BT CG DC EP FT IS LU MG SP UA
Unused stores 16.60 7.21 41.70 4.94 53.07 21.70 39.04 35.11 32.48 41.18
Unused space 8.91 3.59 25.68 1.88 2.42 5.19 5.16 3.56 9.59 5.87
Sum 25.51 10.80 67.38 6.82 55.49 26.89 44.20 38.67 42.07 47.05
Before concluding, it is interesting to note that a significant amount of cache area
was reported during the cache content profiling as holding ‘unused stored data’ (as
shown in Table 4.2 and in Fig. 4.4). As a reminder of how these data were classified
as such, during the cache content profiling, a very short instruction window of 1000
instructions was imposed on the data classification logic to ensure the completion of
the cache content profiler (see Section 4.2). Especially for the case of the memory
store accesses, that cannot be classified until accessed by a consecutive memory load
access, this short instruction window caused a significant fraction of cache contents
to be reported as ‘unused stored data’ because there was no consecutive memory load
access that used them again shortly. This fraction essentially indicates ‘unused stored
data within 1000 instructions from the moment they were stored in memory’ and not
necessarily ‘stored data that will never be accessed again’. As expected, an increased
instruction window would reduce the reported percentage of ‘unused stored data’ and
increase our confidence on the liveliness of the stored data.
Nevertheless, we expect that there is indeed a fraction of cache contents that won’t
be accessed again in the lifetime of an application. This fraction will be significantly
smaller than those reported in Table 4.2 and estimating it would require removing
the instruction window limitation. Such cache areas, that store dead data, point out
another interesting exploitation area that was left as future work. Given that these dead
data cannot affect the execution output, we can avoid strongly protecting them too and
reduce further the strongly-protected cache surface, as long as we can guarantee that
these data won’t be accessed again.
Similar observations hold for the reported ‘unused cache space’ by the cache con-
tent profiler. This space refers to cache area that was never used or that was storing
data whose type has been invalidated (e.g., due to overwriting a part of longer data
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by a shorter one, due to a cache line replacement where not all the new cache line’s
data got accessed and classified, etc.). Therefore this cache area can too be exploited
for a further reduction of the strongly-protected cache surface by the reported average
‘unused cache space’ (Table 4.2).
4.3.2 Practicality Issues of This Case Study
The intention of the presented study was to estimate the maximum potential benefits
of exploiting the vulnerability variation of application data. For that purpose, we de-
cided on demonstrating these benefits for the case of a data cache only to answer the
question of how much we can exploit the vulnerability characteristics of application
data to reduce the strongly-protected surface of a data cache and to what effect on the
reliability QoS level.
As this was a limit study, all potential benefits estimated in this chapter assumed
an optimal fault-tolerant cache design. The assumed design, on top of being able to
drive and protect the data according to their vulnerability, it would have to be able to
reconfigure itself on a per application basis to exactly match to the vulnerability char-
acteristics of the executing application. Assuming an available optimal cache design
that can support fully-reconfigurable unequal protection is what enabled to get inter-
esting results that show that there is promise in a vulnerability-aware reduction of the
strongly-protected cache surface.
Alas, exactly this assumption makes the advocated approach impractical. The prac-
ticality of our approach is limited in its attempt to introduce vulnerability-driven un-
equal protection in the case of an optimal data cache to exploit the per-bit data-level
vulnerability characteristics of application data. This is because a one-to-one trans-
lation of the potential benefits to actual savings is impossible in the case of a cache
design that can offer a reconfigurable strongly-protected cache surface.
Such a design is not trivial to design without negating the savings of unequal pro-
tection. A fully reconfigurable design could be possible where, depending on the exe-
cuting application, the strongly-protected cache surface and protection strength change
depending on the vulnerability characteristics of the application. Sadly a major issue
of such an approach is that the extra configuration options would negate the savings
gained by introducing unequal protection. This is while not considering extra imple-
mentation challenges like detecting online the data vulnerabilities, mapping the data
to cache locations according to their vulnerability and offering different protection
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strength for different data bit ranges. On the other hand, such an approach could pro-
vide with the best trade-offs and a general design usable by general purpose CPUs.
An alternative approach would be to remove the reconfiguration attributes of the
design and statically configure the cache protection given the executing application
vulnerabilities. In such an approach the potential benefits of unequal protection can
still be maximized. Though, as this essentially requires a different design per applica-
tion, it is inapplicable for a general purpose CPU but it could merit such an effort if the
cache were to reside in a specialized CPU or a co-processor.
Finally, the most reasonable approach would be a single cache design with prede-
termined protected cache surface targeting the common case without reconfigurability
properties. I.e., a statically configured cache that offers a predetermined set of par-
titions of different predetermined protection strengths that protect strongly predeter-
mined bit ranges of data. Although this does not offer a lot of flexibility and wouldn’t
maximize the savings, it would be an improvement on reliability costs, compared to
a fully protected cache, and it could work for different workloads. Such an approach
though would come at the expense of potentially increased miss rates as it would re-
quire a vulnerability-aware mapping of data to specific limited cache locations.
All the above point out the reduced practicality of exploiting the per-bit data-
level vulnerability variations in a fully-reconfigurable vulnerability-aware unequally-
protected data cache, despite showing high exploitation potential as measured by the
trade-offs between the strongly-protected surface against fault coverage. This does not
negate the importance of the vulnerability characterization results as they can still be
applied to other levels/structures that can benefit too by unequal protection.
A suggested alternative approach that shows promise and is left as future work
is applying vulnerability-aware unequal-protection to software-level reliability mech-
anisms. A significant drawback in the case of hardware-level reliability mechanisms
has been their lack of flexibility and the requirement of purpose-designed hardware to
support new features. On the other hand, software-level approaches could adapt more
easily to varying vulnerability characteristics while getting performance benefits. E.g.
in an instruction replication based approach, the replication degree may be determined
based on the vulnerability and type of the operands in order to get instant performance
speedup compared to the fully replicated version.
To summarize, although the vulnerability characterization results showed high ex-
ploitation potential, both generally and in the case of a data cache, the practicality of
materializing these maximum benefits for the case of a data cache is limited. This holds
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more true especially when considering an optimal unequally-protected data cache. A
further exploration on how we could translate these benefits into savings for the case
of a data cache is left as future work where a practical implementation can be devised
that does not compromise the maximum potential savings. Nevertheless, as mentioned,
it may be more practical to exploit the vulnerability characterization results in other
approaches instead, especially in software-based approaches due to their inherent flex-
ibility.
To conclude, despite the practicality issues of this case study, the observed trade-offs
showed that there is potential in shifting from fully equally-protected architectures to
vulnerability-aware unequally-protected architectures that exploit the per-bit data-level
vulnerability variations to reduce the total fault-protected surface smoothly against the
reliability QoS levels.
As the total fault-protected surface can be safely reduced to a minimum effect
on the fault coverage, it points out that implementing vulnerability-aware unequal-
protection on existing fault-tolerant approaches on a given structure or same-level
structures is promising to reduce their reliability overhead and improve their perfor-
mance.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we showed the exploitation potential of the characterization insight
obtained in Chapter 3.
There are numerous alternative ways, design targets, areas and mechanisms that
offer grounds for exploiting the application behavior under data corruption. Out of
all the possible alternatives, we focused on exploiting the characterization insight to
reduce the reliability-associated overhead of reliability mechanisms with a minimum
effect on fault coverage by introducing vulnerability-aware unequal-protection in the
case of a data cache by exploiting only the data-related vulnerability variation and,
specifically, the per-bit variations.
We chose this exploitation alternative because it was identified as a promising area
with high exploitability potential; the per-bit data-level vulnerability variations showed
clear and distinct vulnerability patterns, that were consistent among benchmarks (es-
pecially for the case of FP data), with highly different vulnerability intensity levels.
Moreover, applying this insight for the case of a data cache was possible, as a data
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cache can be modified to support vulnerability-driven protection and cache data pro-
tection mechanisms can be adapted to support unequal data word protection.
The high exploitability potential of our chosen alternative was further reaffirmed by
going through a data cache content profiling process that obtained the occupancy rates
of data types within a data cache during the execution of the NPB-serial benchmarks.
The cache profiling results showed that there are data types that dominate the data
cache in large volumes.
These obtained occupancy rates, along with the per-bit data-level characterization
insight, enabled to present a case study to demonstrate how the application data varying
vulnerability characteristics can be exploited for reduced-cost unequal fault protection
in the case of a 64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks. In particular
we explored the potential benefits, when shifting into vulnerability-aware unequal-
protection architectures that can trade off between different reliability QoS levels. The
potential reliability-overhead benefits were measured in terms of strongly-protected
surface reduction against the effect on fault coverage. As our investigation focused on
showing the maximum potential, it was agnostic to an actual architectural design and
assumed the availability of a fault-tolerant data cache with a protection method that
can adapt to unequal protection and a classification mechanism to set the protection
levels of application data accordingly.
Despite the practicality issues of implementing this case study, the performed in-
vestigation pointed out that there is potential in shifting into vulnerability-aware unequal-
protection architectures (by protecting the less-vulnerable areas of a given structure
less than its more-vulnerable counterparts) as a viable alternative to exhaustive equal





As we move into deep submicron fabrication technologies new reliability challenges
start to appear in an ever-increasing rate in all parts of a system (logic, intercon-
nects, memory elements). Examples include interconnects becoming more susceptible
to wire-induced noise, operating voltage/frequency scaling causing timing violations,
gamma ray and alpha particle strikes flipping values in transistors, chips and systems
deteriorating due to ageing or manufacturing defects.
All such occurrences of anomalous physical conditions are called hardware faults
[45] and, according to their duration, are classified into transient, permanent and inter-
mittent faults. Transient faults (soft errors or single event upsets) are faults that occur
only once and do not persist. Permanent faults (hard faults) are faults that occur at
some point in time and persist from that time onward. Intermittent faults are faults that
occur repeatedly but not continuously in the same location.
Generally, a set of four steps is followed to tolerate a fault [45]: (1) Error detec-
tion, where the system becomes aware of the presence of a fault, (2) Error recovery
(error correction), where the system tries to mask the fault’s effect and set the cor-
rect expected behavior, (3) Fault diagnosis, where the type and location of the fault is
identified (not for transient faults), and (4) Self repair, where the system is repaired or
reconfigured to avoid the diagnosed fault. As each step requires a form of redundancy,
fault-tolerant techniques aim to minimize the redundancy-associated performance/cost
penalty, while increasing the fault coverage.
The purpose of fault-tolerant design is to improve dependability by enabling a sys-
tem to perform its intended behavior in the presence of a given number of faults [32].
Hardware reliability and correctness is a design constraint equally important to per-
formance and low cost. It is desirable for systems to make forward progress, even in
99
100 Chapter 5. Related Work
the presence of faults. As such, a lot of related research exists on ensuring the reliable
operation of systems. Furthermore, it is becoming even more imperative to research
on reliability as it is a given fact that the transient error rates will always increase as
the technologies scale [40].
Fault-tolerant techniques may be classified into hardware level, software level or a
combination of both. The level that a technique operates depends on the level where
error detection and error correction take place.
Traditional approaches rely on costly physical redundancy to tolerate hardware
faults. The most elementary approach to hardware-level fault tolerance is to employ
physical redundancy [45]. Its simplest form is dual modular redundancy with a com-
parator. Operations are executed twice and the results are compared to detect faults.
This can be further extended into triple modular redundancy, by adding an additional
replicated module and replacing the comparator with a voter, to enable also error
correction and fault diagnosis. A more general physical redundancy approach is N-
modular redundancy for odd values of N greater than three, that as expected provides
even better detection, correction and diagnosis capabilities.
Physical redundancy may be implemented at different granularity levels, starting
from coarse grain levels, where the whole core is replicated, and moving to finer grain
levels, where ALUs or register files are replicated. All such physical redundancy ap-
proaches come to a high hardware cost and to high power/energy consumption and,
as such, are only used in high-budget and/or mission-critical systems rendering them
unacceptable for commodity systems.
Such exhaustive protection is unnecessary for non-life-critical systems as not all
hardware faults manifest as the same symptom. Depending on the fault location, the
executing workload and the underlying hardware, faults can either (a) get masked by
various levels of fault-masking effects (logic-, architectural-, application-level) and re-
sult in a correct execution with no visible effects or (b) not get masked and result either
in an observable execution upset (application crash, stall or delay) or an unobservable
output corruption (silent data corruption - SDC).
Out of all these possible corruption outcomes SDCs are the most severe as they are
undetectable online by any means and they do not cause any observable indication that
something happened out of the ordinary. The other corruption outcomes are observ-
able and detectable by conventional methods. E.g., software-visible symptom-based
fault detection [50, 27, 37, 13, 8] monitors for suspicious behaviors and symptoms,
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such as violating likely program invariants, memory exceptions, cache misses, branch
mispredictions, fatal exceptions, program crashes, high OS activity, hangs.
Given that not all hardware faults manifest as the same symptom and that it suffices to
protect only against SDCs, this thesis targeted a vulnerability-based characterization of
application behavior under hardware-induced data corruption to identify areas of lower
likelihood to result into an SDC, if a corruption occurs there. As discussed throughout
this thesis, such a characterization can help move away from exhaustive equal pro-
tection to vulnerability-driven unequal protection of a given structure or same-level
structures to get performance/cost benefits without a severe impact on the fault cover-
age.
In this chapter we present prior works that relate to the goals of this thesis. First,
we focus on methods that monitor the behavior of a system under the presence of hard-
ware faults. Then, we discuss about works that implied and/or observed the varying
vulnerability characteristics at various levels (with an extra focus on those that investi-
gate variations at data-level and in caches). Afterwards, we present how related works
approach the necessary requirements in order to implement a shifted fault-tolerance
scheme in a hardware/software co-approach for reliability trade-off purposes. Finally,
we discuss on fault-tolerant cache-related approaches, along with those that can adapt
to different reliability levels for trade-off purposes.
5.1 Monitoring Behavior Under Data Corruption
Various analytical and experimental techniques have long been proposed for monitor-
ing the effects of hardware faults. These usually target to assess the dependability
characteristics of systems and reliability mechanisms and not to drive the design of
reduced-cost reliability mechanisms. Nevertheless they demonstrate that not all hard-
ware faults result into the same outcome and provide guidelines on how to capture the
behavior under data corruption.
5.1.1 Analytical Techniques
Analytical techniques model the behavior of hardware structures under the presence
of faults. Although modeling approaches do not usually correlate the fault’s character-
istics to the effects on the application behavior, they do observe the varying probability
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of a hardware fault in different structures to corrupt the application output. Observing
the vulnerability characteristics of hardware structures is more prevalent in works that
focus on vulnerability factor estimation [31, 46, 47].
Vulnerability factor estimation introduces the concept that not every bit is equally
vulnerable and that the vulnerability factor of a structure is the fraction of vulnera-
ble bits within the total bits of the structure. Vulnerability factors can capture both
microarchitectural and architectural fault-masking effects (Architectural Vulnerability
Factor [31]) in a given structure for a given application through a detailed analysis. In
an AVF analysis the bits of the structure that are required for an Architecturally Correct
Execution (ACE bits) are constantly tracked while simulating the application. All bits
within a structure are assumed as ACE bits, until identified as un-ACE bits, when they
fall into categories of identified classes of bits that do not affect the outcome, e.g., bits
within predictor structures, the non-opcode bits of a NOP instruction, bits in dynami-
cally dead instructions, etc. In order to compute the actual AVF, this ACE analysis was
performed while simulating a set of benchmarks.
Alternative vulnerability factors can estimate the application’s tolerance to faults
in a specified structure independent of the structure’s microarchitectural design (Pro-
gram Vulnerability Factor [46]) or capture only the microarchitectural fault-masking
effects in a hardware structure independent of the application (Hardware Vulnerability
Factor [47]).
5.1.2 Experimental Techniques - Fault Injection
As the models in analytical techniques can get large and complex, such analysis is
usually slow, offers limited insight into an application execution status and tends to
focus on analyzing the behavior of only higher-level hardware structures. An alter-
native is to use experimental techniques, such as experimental verification and error
logging, where a system is monitored during its lifetime to record the causes that led
to its failures, or full-system simulation under simulated faults.
As these are also time consuming, the experimental approach of fault injection has
been widely used as a fast straightforward method to test real systems under realistic
faults. Fault injection has been mainly used for high-level dependability assessment
of reliability mechanisms, systems and applications and it can be hardware imple-
mented [3, 42, 48] or software implemented [20, 42, 48, 7, 39, 17, 14]. Fault-injection
experiments perform a set of iterative tests on a system while a given application is
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executing. In every iteration, a fault is modeled and the full execution is monitored to
determine the exact effect of the injected fault on the application’s execution.
In hardware-implemented fault injection faults are injected into the hardware
layer of the target system either physically by electromagnetic interference and radi-
ation [3] or through the pins of an integrated circuit [42, 48]. Although this injection
approach injects real hardware faults that can reach all possible locations, it lacks flexi-
bility and is difficult to operate and control. Furthermore, hardware-implemented fault
injection suffers from low portability as it targets specific systems, requires special
purpose dedicated hardware to access the tested hardware and can possibly damage
the tested system.
On the contrary, software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) overcomes most
of these drawbacks by injecting realistic faults using software methods. SWIFI achieves
higher properties of repeatability, controllability (in space and time), reproducibility,
non-intrusiveness and efficacy [3]. Furthermore, it is less expensive in terms of time
and effort and more flexible to repeatedly test and monitor the end-to-end behavior of
a system while executing a variety of applications.
SWIFI though cannot emulate all fault models and cannot reach all possible hard-
ware locations that could get corrupted; it is limited into emulating faults in software-
visible structures only. Nevertheless software-injected faults can model other high-
level models that correspond to other realistic lower-level faults.
Generally, in SWIFI, transient faults are injected by adding traps or replacing in-
structions, either at pre-runtime or at runtime, depending on the fault trigger and the
injection mechanisms. Pre-runtime injection methods mutate the application before-
hand, e.g., by substituting instructions and program data by false words [14] or by
source code mutation [17]. Runtime injection methods most commonly corrupt mem-
ory or register contents using time-based triggers (faults injected at specified times),
path-based triggers (faults injected at specified events) or stress-based triggers (faults
injected at specified workload threshold levels). The software injection mechanism can
be implemented by: direct program memory image corruption [39], dynamic process
control structure corruption using debugging registers [20, 48, 7], forcing execution
of pre-loaded routines using either software traps [42, 17] or hardware breakpoints of
specific target systems [42, 48].
As fault-injection testing captures all levels of fault-masking effects, it has been
widely used mainly to evaluate the fault coverage of proposed reliability approaches
against the non-protected case [35, 8, 6, 27, 37, 13, 41, 22, 29]. Although usually the
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purpose is to measure the fault coverage, these works typically do offer a breakdown
of possible execution outcomes per tested workload. Therefore, it is observed that the
effect of a hardware fault is not always the same and that it also depends on the inherent
fault-tolerance attributes of the workload. On the other hand, these approaches perform
limited testing and are usually not thorough enough to correlate the corruption effect
to the corrupted location attributes, as they are agnostic to the characteristics of the
injected fault.
5.2 Observing Vulnerability Variations
The aforementioned works focused mainly on dependability assessment of reliability
mechanisms and not on vulnerability characterization, that was the focus of this thesis.
In this section we present prior works that are driven by the varying vulnerabilities of
hardware/software structures and investigate possible error sensitivity classifications.
Some fault-tolerant approaches have implied a classification of hardware parts to get
cost/performance benefits albeit without a formal exploration of their vulnerabilities.
One such approach, known as timing speculation, trades-off error rate against per-
formance/cost in the sense that it pushes the boundaries of the operational frequency
or voltage into ranges where timing faults are known to occur. Then, extra hardware
mechanisms are added to detect/correct these resulting errors. Timing speculation al-
lows to operate constantly below critical voltage or above critical frequency and gain
in cost/performance at the expense of the uncommon case that will fail and will need
extra time/support for correction. For this approach to be successful, the added de-
tection/correction hardware must be fast/cheap enough during error-free operation, so
that it doesn’t negate the overall performance/cost benefits of the timing speculation.
Another timing speculation approach to increase performance relies on pairing
two cores in a chip multiprocessor and run the same (or similar) code on both of
them [4, 49, 15]. One of the cores will execute speculatively (in other words, in a
relaxed functional correctness manner) in order to advance quicker within the appli-
cation and get execution hints in advance (such as data values, branch outcomes, etc.)
that will be communicated to the other core. The other core will execute the same code
correctly, without any speculation, but faster due to the received execution hints. This
results into both cores running faster combined than either could alone. Meanwhile
the non-speculative core, due to its reliable design and always-on nature, will ensure
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the correctness of the speculative execution. When throughput is required instead of
response time, the pair may be decoupled and operate independently at the safe fre-
quency. Also, as this approach relies on a second core that executes the same code, it
offers protection against transient faults too and not only against timing errors.
In the above approaches, that targeted a trade-off between performance/cost and er-
ror rate, the faults are mainly caused due to timing violations that are a direct result of
the imposed operating frequency/voltage. In order to offer a transparent and manage-
able fault-tolerant scheme, effort was put into minimizing the number of occurring tim-
ing violations by optimizing the common case at the expense of the uncommon case.
This is a first indication that not all hardware parts need to be protected equally and that
hardware may be classified based on its vulnerability. In particular, timing speculation
approaches implied a classification based on the frequency [16, 19] or delay [52, 11]
of logic paths by allowing timing/voltage faults on less frequently exercised paths or
longer delay paths to gain in cost/performance for the common case.
Similarly, existing cache-specific approaches have implied a vulnerability classifica-
tion of cache lines based on their access patterns by assigning higher protection prior-
ity to the most frequently/recently used cache lines [55] or only to the most recently
used cache line in every cache set [22] or only to the dirty cache lines [23]. Such clas-
sification is usually obtained through analytical methods or experimental testing. E.g.,
in [22] fault-injection experiments were performed on a partially protected cache to
measure the propagation of injected faults into visible corruptions and to deduce that
the most recently used cache lines are more vulnerable.
An analytical alternative to model the behavior of caches under the presence of
transient faults is to create a statistical model of a simplified cache and an error propa-
gation model [44]. Faults in both caches and registers are modeled and their propaga-
tion is studied taking into account possible application masking effects, e.g., an erro-
neous cache entry being overwritten by a new value. To test the validity of the proposed
error propagation model, a series of fault-injection tests was performed. Although this
is not an exact characterization study of data corruption effects on application behav-
ior, it is a promising approach that can be used to estimate the theoretical maximum
percentage of corrupted outputs for an application that executes in an unreliable cache.
Further modeling of the architectural masking effects of faults occurring in cache
lines has been taken into account in [30] where the mean time to failure of a data cache
is computed based on its size and its architectural vulnerability factor, assuming that
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the cache fails when two transient faults hit the same line.
More specific fault-injection experiments that try to characterize the effect of data
corruption depending on the fault location appear in [34], where soft errors are simu-
lated to perform fault-injection experiments in an instruction cache and a data cache to
measure the effects on the execution depending on the location of the injected bit-flip.
The injected locations are distinguished (a) between the instruction cache and the data
cache and (b) between the cache tag and the cache data. In this approach the injec-
tion results showed that the data cache lines and tags are particularly vulnerable, that
the vulnerability of the instruction cache lines depends on the application, and that the
instruction cache tags are not as vulnerable.
As fault-masking effects occur up to application level, different execution behavior un-
der the presence of hardware faults is expected for different applications and among
dependability-aware redesigned versions of the same application [18, 43]. Thus, mov-
ing to software abstraction level is promising to observe the varying effects of faults
on application behavior [48, 17].
Similarly, fault injection experiments have been used as a way to measure the de-
pendability of applications and show how the workload characteristics affect the be-
havior under corruption. Such an observation is made in [12], where through fault-
injection experiments in a data cache, it is noticed that the resulting error rate depends
on the application’s input size and the way the application uses the data cache. As
the application’s input size increases, the error rate increases, until the input size is
large enough to fill and fit exactly in the data cache. Then the maximum error rate is
observed and, from that point on, as the input size keeps increasing the observed error
rate starts decreasing. This behavior is explained by the cache occupancy rates and the
cache miss rates, that force the correct values to be fetched from the main memory.
Similar varying vulnerability characteristics are expected among application segments
and instructions, as implied in software-level approaches where code segments [9, 35]
or individual instructions [6] are marked as critical to set the desired protection level.
The same variation can be more formally observed by reliability-aware software anal-
ysis to detect statistically-vulnerable code segments [13] and instructions [6, 29].
Moving to application data granularity, it has been implied that the corruption effects
vary depending on the data characteristics. For example, data segments can be marked
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as approximate if their preciseness is not required for correct execution [38].
In existing cache-specific fault-tolerant approaches that don’t protect all cache lines
equally, there is an implicit classification of the vulnerability of data based on the
probability of being accessed. The most recently accessed and most frequently used
variables are considered more error-prone and a higher protection priority must be
set for them [22]. The motivation behind this is that most frequently used data are
likely to be used again and, if corrupted, are more prone to affect the execution. On
the other hand, inactive data have a higher probability of getting replaced/overwritten,
thus possible corruption there will get masked. Different methods may be employed
to identify such frequently used data. In [55] thresholds are set to define when data
should be considered as frequently used or as inactive.
As before, software analysis can be employed to further elaborate on the criticality
of application data, e.g., by profiling data according to their liveliness [29] suggesting
that more-frequently used data are more likely to corrupt the output. An even finer-
grained analysis is performed by the MASK technique [8] that statically analyzes the
code to find specific bits within data, that have a known value, that if flipped will
certainly cause an application to fail.
Once more, fault injection can be used for the same purpose. In [26], after fault-
injection experiments, data segments are marked as non-failure-critical if they affect
the output of multimedia workloads, where the output correctness requirements are
relaxed. Finally, finer-grained control of the injected fault’s location and monitoring of
the execution can be used instead to provide more insight on the corruption effects [5].
As an instance, fault injection experiments on specific microarchitectural structures
while monitoring the execution, apart from offering a breakdown of outcome types per
tested structure, have been used to correlate the fault injection location [27, 37] or the
execution outcome [41] to the time between fault injection and fault detection.
5.3 Shifting to a Hardware/Software Co-Approach
As mentioned, it is a given fact that the hardware/software parts are not equally vul-
nerable to faults. These inherent vulnerability variations may be leveraged to trade-off
between reliability and performance/cost in a hardware/software co-approach. Such a
trade-off suggests that the reliability levels may be set and defined by the application
or the system designer. To be able to set the reliability levels, an interface and commu-
nication mechanisms are needed, along with fault-tolerant techniques (either hardware
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or software-level techniques) that are configurable to different protection strengths.
In this section we present the relevant details of existing works regarding (a) how to
set and communicate the desired fault-tolerance levels, (b) how to configure the fault-
tolerance levels and (c) how to expose hardware faults to be corrected by the software.
Setting and Communicating the Fault-Tolerance Levels As there is the need to set
the desired reliability levels, we will now focus on (a) how the existing works allow
the application, developer, compiler or runtime system to set the reliability levels and
on (b) how information is communicated between the software and the hardware to set
the required QoS reliability levels.
• API to set fault requirements: There are a few alternatives on how to specify
the API in order to set the desired fault requirements: In [9] code segments are
wrapped in code blocks in order to be executed in less-reliable hardware. In [6]
the application developer specifies the desired level of fault-tolerance for each
instruction or group of instructions, either in high-level language or in assembly
code. In [35] the programmer may protect individual code segments and also
set the method for error correction. It is a given that all such approaches are
accompanied by a respective compiler.
• Setting fault requirements automatically during compilation: The aforemen-
tioned developer-guided schemes that use a specified API to set the criticality
levels are not very practical as the programmer’s effort is required. A better
alternative is to get the compiler to perform this task automatically, either by
performing static analysis or a profile-guided compilation. In [6], it is proposed,
among others, a naive automatic compiler scheme that assigns the highest fault-
tolerance degree to all control flow instructions and all instructions on which
these control flow instructions depend. In [13] the compiler analysis sets fault-
tolerance levels by duplicating instructions in only what it considers as vulner-
able code segments. In [26], based on fault-injection experiments that provided
with vulnerability estimates, the compiler detects/sets the vulnerability of vari-
ables thus directing their fault requirements.
• Communicating fault requirements to the fault-tolerant hardware: The set fault
requirements need to be communicated to the fault-tolerant hardware and this
can be done in various ways: By modifying the instruction’s encoding to in-
corporate the required fault-tolerance degree [6]. By extending the ISA with
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special instructions to configure the adaptive fault-tolerant hardware to the spec-
ified fault-tolerance level [6] or to mark critical and non-critical parts of an ap-
plication [9]. By introducing new instructions for each combination of original
instruction and reliability level [6]. By directly mapping the application data into
protected or unprotected hardware based on their vulnerability [26].
Fault-Tolerance Level Configuration: In order to configure the reliability level of the
fault-tolerance technique (either for software or hardware techniques), the technique
itself must be adaptable to varying degrees of protection strength. E.g., ECC code
is able to change in order to detect/correct more or less errors. Such a configuration
requirement is not necessary when the protection levels are just non-protection vs.
full-protection, as long as the protection mechanism can be turned on and off.
Although there are approaches that dynamically self-tune to the current error rate,
they do not count as a configurable fault-tolerant scheme in the way we define it. A
method that changes the causes of the faults to control the error rates is different from
a method that offers different levels of protection on an existing error rate. Such a
self-tuned approach, that adapts to the increased error rates due to voltage scaling, is
described in [11] where the error rate is monitored constantly and the supply voltage
is dynamically scaled to sustain a reference error rate. Similarly, in [4] the DIVA
approach is modified into a self-tuned system that reacts to the current error rate by
scaling the operating frequency and voltage.
More interesting are the methods that, for a given error rate, may adapt their fault-
tolerance levels. As mentioned, the techniques themselves must be configurable. Most
existing approaches that use configurable hardware fault-tolerance techniques set these
levels statically at design time. E.g., by setting reliable and non-reliable cores [9] or
reliable and non-reliable cache lines [26, 23, 22, 55, 23]. On the contrary, software-
level techniques lend themselves more naturally to configuration than hardware-level
techniques. E.g., in [6] the software fault-tolerance technique of duplicating instruc-
tions is used that can be easily configured at design time to specified lower or higher
degrees of fault-tolerance by disabling duplication or using triplication respectively.
Exposing Hardware Faults to the Software: All software-only fault-tolerance tech-
niques are effectively exposed to hardware faults. Here we are going to focus only on
approaches that explicitly allow a hardware fault to be corrected using software-level
fault-tolerance techniques:
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• In [9] faults are detected on hardware level and reported to be corrected by the
software, only if the software has marked the specific application part to not be
corrected at hardware level.
• In [27] a cooperative hardware/software solution is designed that relies on sim-
ple low-overhead hardware detectors along with higher-level anomalous soft-
ware behavior detectors. In order to provide with a scheme that fully protects
the system with low overheads, a shift is proposed from detecting a hard fault
immediately to detecting the effects of the fault at application level (with low
cost software monitors for specific symptoms that were explicitly formulated).
This was mainly motivated by the the fact that only hardware faults that propa-
gate and become observable to software need to be handled.
5.4 Fault-Tolerant Cache Design
There has been extensive research on fault-tolerant caches and memories. This is be-
cause DRAM and SRAM have always been more susceptible than logic to transient
errors. Moreover, due to their relative size comparative to the rest of the processor,
faults are more probable to occur in caches and memories. In this section we are going
to focus on existing works that relate to our objective of a fault-tolerant data cache
architecture that, on top of that, can offer different concurrent levels of protection to
trade-off performance/cost against reliability.
Fault Tolerance in Caches: As cache is a structure that holds information, it natu-
rally lends itself to be protected by applying information redundancy and using error-
detecting codes (EDC). The main idea behind information redundancy is to add re-
dundant bits to a dataword to detect when it has been affected by an error [45]. The
most common EDC is parity. Odd (or even) parity adds one parity bit to a dataword to
convert it into a codeword that now has an odd (or even) total number of ones. With
the addition of just one parity bit, it is possible now to detect one single-bit error in the
dataword. A natural evolution of parity is to increase the width of the code to detect
more that one single-bit errors in the dataword. This is further extended into becom-
ing an error-correcting code (ECC) that adds enough redundant bits to also provide
correction.
Using EDC and ECC is a simple solution for detecting and correcting errors in stor-
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age and offers an easy ground for tradeoffs between reliability and performance/cost
just by varying the number of the extra protection bits. Unfortunately, as the EDC/ECC
strength is increased, the area and energy overhead grows quickly, while reading and
computing the codewords starts to become a performance bottleneck during read op-
erations [21].
To avoid the performance penalties, several alternative approaches have been pro-
posed that vary the way EDC and ECC are applied to the memory hierarchy. All of
them put effort on decoupling EDC from ECC, so that the high cost of the infrequent
error correction does not affect the common error-free case.
• An approach used by commercial processors [36] is to take advantage of the in-
herent information redundancy in memory hierarchies by enabling single error-
detection code in write-through L1 data caches, along with single error-correcting
code in the respective L2 cache.
• Another approach [23] is to store the ECC in a different structure and apply it
only to correct dirty cache lines, while the rest clean lines are protected with sim-
ple parity EDC. Additionally the dirty cache lines may be periodically cleaned
by forcing write-backs to higher level caches.
• In [36] only the EDC bits needed for error detection are added to the L1 cache,
in order to keep it small and fast in the error-free case. To support the necessary
error correction, the remaining ECC bits are stored separately in a dedicated ECC
recovery cache, allowing for higher coverage without affecting the performance
of the error-free operation.
Other similar approaches choose to store the remaining ECC bits in different
structures. In [54] the extra correction information is stored in the memory hier-
archy as cacheable data, dynamically and transparently partitioning the last level
cache into data parts and error codes. In [53] the extra correction information is
stored in a dedicated FIFO structure located in low-cost off-chip DRAM without
affecting the application’s cache behavior.
• An approach that reunites EDC and ECC is proposed in [22], where both EDCs
and ECCs are stored into the same dedicated parity cache that holds the correct-
ing codes only for the most recently used cache line per set.
• In [21] a two-dimensional coding scheme is used that decouples error detection
from error correction. Conventional per-word horizontal error coding is applied
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only for error detection and small-scale error correction, while vertical across-
words error coding is used for scalable multi-bit error correction purposes that
doesn’t affect the latency of normal operation.
ECCs tend to be small enough and correct up to one error to avoid the perfor-
mance/cost overheads of stronger codes. Furthermore, detection and correction is usu-
ally performed when a cache line is accessed. As the time between accesses varies,
there is a chance of multiple faults occurring that cannot be detected/corrected by the
chosen single-error ECCs. Instead of increasing the strength of the code, [30] intro-
duces the use of scrubbing in caches where the cache structure periodically reads each
of its entries, corrects any errors, recomputes the ECC and writes the bits back. By
introducing this periodical check mechanism, the maximum time between accessing
cache data is bounded and the need for increasing the code’s strength is avoided.
Fault-tolerant cache approaches may avoid information redundancy and encoding
by using the expensive physical redundancy approach and replicate the whole cache
structure. An improvement on this scheme is using a shadow cache [22] where replicas
of only the most recently used cache line per set are stored to be compared with the
ones in the original cache for error-detection purposes.
Another class of approaches that employ a modification of physical redundancy are
those that use existing available space to replicate values. In such approaches, cache
lines may be replicated in place of dead cache lines and then compare the replicated
lines for error detection, while taking care not to evict lines that may be needed or not
to incur very high extra power consumption [55].
Other approaches may use the existing available space to substitute cache parts that
suffer from hard errors (that are detected offline during booting or periodical tests):
• Faulty cache lines may be disabled completely and substituted into adapted ex-
isting structures [2], such as the victim cache, or substituted into original cache
space reserved specifically for accommodating faulty cache lines [51].
• Another approach is to disable the faulty cache parts and continue execution in a
reduced capacity cache. E.g., complete faulty cache parts may be disabled [25],
even if the parts range from a cache line up to the whole cache. Alternatively,
faulty cache subblocks may be disabled while the rest cache line is still in use [1].
In any case, when disabling faulty cache parts, it is important to maintain the
coverage of the whole address space by the remaining cache parts and take care
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to remap the address space in an efficient way so that the performance hit can be
highly predictable [1].
• An alternative, where the faulty cache parts are not discarded, is to pair a faulty
cache block with another faulty cache block in the same set to form an oper-
ational block [24, 51], taking advantage of their non-overlapping faulty parts.
Furthermore, extra spare lines are available for completely faulty lines.
Trading-off Performance/Cost Against Reliability in Caches: All presented cache
fault-tolerant approaches can trade-off between performance/cost against fault cover-
age by varying their design parameters, even if this was not their original intent. E.g., as
the ECC correction strength can be changed at design time, the discussed ECC-based
cache schemes may also become more (or less) robust at the expense of increased
(or decreased) performance/cost penalty. Here we are going to focus on cache fault-
tolerant approaches that, by design, target to trade-off performance/cost against error
coverage and may not protect all cache parts equally to offer multiple concurrent levels
of fault tolerance, that preferably can be reconfigured online.
A first attempt to trade-off performance/cost against fault coverage is by protect-
ing only a portion of the cache and essentially providing with two concurrent fault-
tolerance levels (protected and non-protected):
• In [26] a partially protected cache is proposed. It is essentially two caches at
the same memory hierarchy level where one of them has error-protection mech-
anisms against transient faults and the other is unprotected. Through fault-
injection experiments the vulnerability of classes of data is determined, fol-
lowed by a compiler analysis to map the data based on their vulnerabilities to
the protected or the unprotected cache partition. To further optimize the pro-
posed scheme’s coverage and balance the trade-off between cost and fault cov-
erage, a design space exploration strategy is devised to discover the best cache
partitioning configuration.
• A similar trading-off approach where not all cache lines are protected is de-
scribed in [22]. In this approach, the coverage is compromised to reduce area
and energy costs of ECC by only protecting the cache lines that have been more
recently used in every cache set. Among other considerations, it is suggested
that cache lines that are frequently accessed may have a higher probability of
corruption due to low noise margins during read/write operations.
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Other approaches trade-off performance/cost against fault coverage by protecting
some cache lines more than others and essentially providing with two concurrent fault-
tolerance levels (protected and stronger-protected):
• In [55] it is proposed to protect all the cache lines with parity code, while repli-
cating the most frequently/recently used ones in place of dead cache lines, in
order to offer different concurrent levels of cache fault tolerance. Furthermore,
adapting the thresholds, that define when a cache line should be replicated and
when a cache line is considered dead, effectively reconfigures the amount of
lines that are more protected and also allows for performance/power vs. reliabil-
ity trade-offs.
• To trade-off area at the expense of performance/bandwidth, in [23] only the dirty
cache lines are protected with ECC, while clean cache lines are protected only
with EDC. Specifically only one dirty cache line is allowed to be protected with
ECC per set in a 4-way set associative cache. If a larger number of lines in a set
requires ECC, a write-back is forced to make space for the new ECC.
All approaches that trade-off performance/cost against reliability lend themselves
naturally for graceful degradation purposes. The same applies for approaches that treat
some values as more important than others. Because caches are mechanisms to im-
prove program performance, they naturally allow to overuse their inherent redundancy
and even disable their faulty portions, in order to maintain correctness at the cost of a
gracefully degrading performance.
This cache characteristic essentially allows for a smooth trade-off between power/cost
and performance, while sustaining the fault coverage at the expense of performance. A
scheme that allows for a voltage scaled operation with a performance hit while main-
taining high fault-coverage is discussed in [1]. Similarly in [51], two low-overhead
schemes are developed to allow operation in lower voltage at the expense of lower
cache capacity. One scheme uses pairs of cache lines to form logical cache lines. The
other uses a quarter of the cache to store the fault locations and repair bits for the rest
of the cache. As a result, two performance levels are offered; either a high-voltage op-
eration with full cache capacity, either a lower-voltage operation with reduced cache-
capacity. In both cases, hard faults are detected during boot memory testing and are
isolated. Finally, in [25] the impact on the program performance is measured under
increasing hard error rates in a data cache. Some degrading strategies are proposed in
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order to maintain the cache correctness by disabling faulty cache lines and sets, up to
disabling the whole cache. In any case, it is important that the whole address space is
covered by the cache, no matter the amount of disabled cache parts.
5.5 Summary
Reliability challenges have long been present in all parts of a system due to occurrences
of anomalous physical conditions known as hardware faults. To mitigate the resulting
reliability concerns, wide research work is present to enable fault-tolerance properties
in systems.
Traditionally, the reliability approaches relied on costly redundancy to exhaustively
protect all parts of a system. As not all hardware fault manifest as the same symptom,
this thesis targeted a vulnerability-based characterization of application behavior under
data corruption to identify areas of lower vulnerability. The purpose of this character-
ization was to help avoid the exhaustive protection by shifting to vulnerability-driven
unequal protection of a given structure to get performance/cost benefits without a se-
vere impact on fault coverage. For that reason, in this chapter we focused on prior
works that related to the goals of this thesis.
First, we presented methods that monitor the effects of hardware faults. These
methods are generally classified into analytical and experimental techniques. Analyti-
cal techniques model the behavior of hardware structures under the presence of faults,
are usually slow, offer limited insight and tend to focus on analyzing the behavior
of higher-level hardware structures only. An alternative is to use experimental tech-
niques that rely on monitoring/simulating a system under real/simulated faults. Within
the family of experimental techniques, fault injection (either hardware or software-
implemented) has been widely used as a faster method to test real systems under real-
istic faults.
As the analytical/experimental techniques are most commonly used for depend-
ability assessment of reliability mechanisms and not for vulnerability characterization,
we proceeded on discussing prior works that are driven by the varying vulnerabili-
ties of hardware/software structures. Some of them imply vulnerability classifications
without a formal exploration in order to get performance/cost benefits. Others follow
a more formal approach to observe the vulnerability variations, usually through an-
alytical modeling or fault-injection testing. In any case, the variations are observed
at different abstraction levels; starting from application level and full processor level,
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then going down to caches, code segments and individual instructions, before reaching
data-level and bit-level variations.
In order to exploit the varying vulnerabilities, a shift into a vulnerability-driven
fault-tolerance scheme is required where one can trade-off the reliability QoS against
the performance/cost in a hardware/software co-approach. To do so, we discussed
how existing works implement the necessary features to support such a trading-off
approach. In particular, (a) how the desired fault-tolerance levels are set and com-
municated, (b) how the fault-tolerance strength is reconfigured and (c) how to expose
hardware faults to be corrected by the software.
Finally, since this thesis focused on measuring the benefits of vulnerability-driven
unequal protection in the case of a data cache, we concluded this chapter with the
prevalent cache protection approaches and existing fault-tolerant cache designs that
can adapt to trade-off reliability QoS against performance/cost.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Hardware reliability challenges have always been present in all parts of a system man-
ifesting due to occurrences of anomalous physical conditions called hardware faults.
Hardware faults render the systems unreliable, thus a multitude of related works ex-
ists on ensuring the fault tolerance of systems. The purpose of such fault-tolerant
mechanisms is to improve dependability by enabling a system to perform its intended
behavior even in the presence of a given number of faults.
Such reliability solutions always come with associated performance and cost over-
heads in their effort to ensure the highest possible fault coverage. Traditionally, reli-
ability solutions are aimed to protect equally and exhaustively all hardware parts of a
system. This is in order to provide the illusion of a correctly operating hardware. But
as shrinking semiconductor technologies come at the cost of higher susceptibility to
hardware faults, this approach can no longer be sustainable.
To our benefit, not all hardware faults end up manifesting as errors in the systems
behavior and the executing applications behavior. Depending on the fault character-
istics (location, type, timing, duration), the executing workload and the underlying
hardware, faults can either (a) get masked by various levels of fault-masking effects
(logic-, architectural-, application-level) and result in a correct execution with no vis-
ible effects or (b) not get masked and result either in an observable execution upset
(application crash, stall or delay) or an unobservable output corruption (silent data
corruption).
As we face the problem of increasing error rates that induce unsustainable higher
reliability costs, especially due to the equal and exhaustive protection, this thesis pro-
posed a solution mainly motivated by the various levels of fault-masking effects. We
proposed that we can avoid protecting equally and exhaustively the underlying hard-
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ware by breaking the illusion of a fully protected hardware layer. To do so we sug-
gested a shift to vulnerability-driven unequal-protection mechanisms, where the pro-
tection strength of a given structure (or same-level structures) is assigned according to
the error sensitivity of the components under protection. This means that in order to
solve the original problem of high unsustainable reliability costs we shifted the prob-
lem into: (a) observing and characterizing the exact end-to-end effects of hardware
faults on application behavior, and (b) exploiting the gained insight in a vulnerability-
driven reliability mechanism to reduce the reliability overheads.
This chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing in Section 6.1 the proposed ap-
proach to reach the thesis goals. Section 6.2 presents our main contributions, while
Section 6.3 concludes this thesis with some suggestions for future works.
6.1 Summary
In Chapter 2 we described our instrumentation-based software-implemented fault-
injection (SWIFI) framework for enabling our data-aware characterization study of
the exact data corruption effects on application behavior. Our SWIFI framework uti-
lized a single-fault injection tool1 that is to be repeatedly invoked to inject single-bit
transient faults at uniformly chosen memory load accesses during separate runs of an
application-under-test. Its purpose is to monitor the application behavior under data
corruption, while tracking the corrupted application data, to report detailed diagnostics
regarding the corruption characteristics and the corruption effects.
In Chapter 3 we employed our SWIFI framework to extensively test the NPB-
serial benchmark suite (7.8 million fault-injection tests in total) and then aggregated all
the detailed reported results in order to observe how application behavior varies under
data corruption depending on the characteristics of the corruption and the executing
workload.
The amount of performed tests enabled us to, first, present the top-level workload-
related vulnerability variations in NPB-serial before moving on to application data re-
lated vulnerability variations. We showed how the application behavior in NPB-serial
benchmarks varied depending on the characteristics of the corrupted application data;
in particular, the size, usage type, user and location in memory of the corrupted data.
Then we moved on to a finer-granularity characterization where we showed how the
1Additional relevant supplementary material is detailed in Appendix A.
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application data vulnerability varied depending on the exact bit location of the injected
corruption. This allowed to safely identify distinct bit ranges within application data
types where the probability to result into an SDC, if corrupted, is very low.
Moreover, given the reported information by our fault-injection tool (relating to the
corruption characteristics and the corruption effects) and our original fault model (sin-
gle bit flips at memory locations just before memory load accesses), we extrapolated
the original fault model to model as many other locations of corruption as possible.
This enabled to observe the vulnerability variations of NPB-serial benchmarks within
the memory space, the register file and among instruction-level characteristics (includ-
ing instruction type vulnerability variations, program space vulnerability variations
and program vulnerability phase detection) without the need to remodel and repeat the
experiments.
Generally, the characterization results showed exploitation potential in various lo-
cations, even if they are to be used in a per-application basis assuming a previously
vulnerability-characterized application. This enabled to proceed to estimate the ex-
ploitation potential of the obtained characterization insight.
In Chapter 4, after discussing the numerous alternative options that offer grounds
for exploiting the application behavior under data corruption, we chose a particular
exploitation alternative because it was identified as a promising area with high ex-
ploitability potential. To be precise, we focused on exploiting the characterization
insight to reduce the reliability-associated overhead of reliability mechanisms with
a minimum effect on fault coverage by introducing vulnerability-aware unequal pro-
tection in the case of a data cache by exploiting only the data-related vulnerability
variation and, specifically, the per-bit variations.
Then we proceeded to present a case study to demonstrate how the application
data varying vulnerability characteristics can be exploited for reduced-cost unequal
fault protection in the case of a 64K data cache running the NPB-serial benchmarks.
In particular we explored the potential benefits when shifting into vulnerability-aware
unequal-protection architectures that can trade off between different reliability QoS
levels. The potential reliability-overhead benefits were measured in terms of strongly-
protected surface reduction against the effect on fault coverage. As our investigation
focused on showing the maximum potential, it was agnostic to an actual architectural
design and assumed the availability of a fault-tolerant data cache with a protection
method that can adapt to unequal protection and a classification mechanism to set the
protection levels of application data accordingly.
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Despite the practicality issues of implementing this case study, the performed in-
vestigation pointed out that there is potential in shifting into vulnerability-aware unequal-
protection architectures (by protecting the less-vulnerable areas of a given structure
less than their more-vulnerable counterparts) as a viable alternative to exhaustive equal
protection in order to reduce the reliability overheads with a minimum effect on a sys-
tem’s dependability.
Finally, in Chapter 5, some background information on fault tolerance was dis-
cussed followed by prior works that related to the goals of this thesis. The presented
relevant studies generally related to methods that investigate the varying vulnerabili-
ties of hardware and software components, methods that attempt to unequally protect
a system and methods that trade-off reliability against cost/performance.
6.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we made the following main contributions:
• We established a portable instrumentation-based SWIFI framework that can
perform extensive tests on target binaries for a data-aware characterization study
of the exact data corruption effects on application behavior, where all possible
levels of fault-masking effects are captured.
• After extensive experimental fault-injection tests, we observed different levels
of vulnerability variations. The most promising among them was the workload-
related vulnerability variation of application data of the NPB-serial benchmarks
based on their characteristics, along with the vulnerability variation within parts
of application data. For given application data characteristics, we identified clear
patterns of less-vulnerable bit ranges that if corrupted are less likely to cause
SDCs, e.g., up to 32 LSBs of floating-point data in CG have each less than 1%
probability to cause an SDC. The other observed vulnerability variations were in
areas such as the memory space, the register file, individual instructions and the
program space.
• We demonstrated the potential exploitability of our data-level characteri-
zation findings in a generic fault-tolerant data cache running the NPB-serial
benchmarks. Assuming a vulnerability-aware unequal-protection mechanism we
showed how much we can exploit the vulnerability characteristics of application
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data and to what effect on the reliability QoS level, e.g., the fault-protected sur-
face of a 64K data cache can be reduced by 41% with a less than 0.01% drop in
the fault coverage just by avoiding protection of the less-vulnerable bit ranges of
floating-point data in EP.
6.3 Future Works
This section concludes this thesis by sketching some ideas for future works and im-
provements related to (a) the characterization of application behavior under data cor-
ruption and (b) the exploitation of the vulnerability insight. Some of these proposals
for future work are the following:
• Characterizing other applications: Throughout the thesis the potential in char-
acterizing the application behavior under data corruption was demonstrated only
for the case of the serial versions of the programs from NPB. Similar investiga-
tion through fault-injection testing is suggested for other types of benchmarks to
observe their vulnerability variation and establish if the insight gained in this the-
sis is observed in other programs too. Equally interesting would be to adapt the
SWIFI tool implementation to support multithreaded programs. This can enable
the characterization of more programs and also to investigate the vulnerabilities
of an extra type of data, those that control the parallel execution.
• Classification of data types according to their higher-level semantic usage:
We propose augmenting the usage type classification of the SWIFI framework to
support detection of higher-level semantic usage information of the application
data, i.e., classify them as loop counters, boolean values, pixel colors, parallel
execution control values, etc. This could provide more useful information on
the vulnerability of data depending on the exact way they are used and could
lead to better guidelines regarding which data types to protect stronger or which
data types to avoid using at application development or, even, how to drive a
compiler-level vulnerability-aware software transformation.
• Measuring the deviation of reported wrong outputs from the correct ex-
pected one: Given that there is an extra fault-masking level at user level, which
we did not consider in this thesis, where the output corruption is not being per-
ceived as a wrong output, e.g., a single wrong pixel color in a frame of a video,
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we propose measuring the deviation of reported wrong outputs from the correct
expected one. In such a setting, after deciding deviation thresholds, we can stop
considering all SDCs as equally severe and further reduce the vulnerable areas
that need to be protected.
• Increasing the propagation tracking capabilities of the characterization frame-
work: This could help obtain more details on the propagation of the corruption
throughout the system to understand how exactly data corruption propagates and
where/when exactly does it transform to become an SDC.
• Machine learning analysis of the experimental fault-injection results: This
could automate the process of identifying the areas of high exploitability poten-
tial out of the large amount of data available after the extensive fault-injection
experiments.
• Automatic characterization of application behavior under data corruption:
Instead of extensively testing the full program or memory space of an applica-
tion, an interesting future work could be to identify program/memory segments
that are representative enough so that it suffices to test only those and still be
able to get a reliable estimation of the vulnerabilities of the equivalent full appli-
cation.
• A practical implementation of a vulnerability exploitation hardware-based
approach: As the maximum potential benefits of exploiting the characterization
insight were estimated in this thesis assuming an optimal data cache design, it
would be relevant to investigate the design choices and effects in a practical im-
plementation. By that means it could also be investigated how the potential ex-
ploitation benefits translate into real-world savings (i.e., area cost, performance,
power) and to what effect on the fault coverage. Alternatively, a similar investi-
gation could be performed for a software-based approach.
• Exploiting the characterization insight in a hardware/software co-approach:
As the characterization insight provides data-level vulnerabilities, it is natural to
be applied at software-implemented reliability mechanisms. This can be espe-
cially promising if there is communication between the hardware and the soft-
ware layer to help each other drive their own partial reliability mechanism, i.e.,
the hardware layer can knowingly let faults propagate to the software layer that
could be then become fault-aware and protect against them. Another promising
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benefit enabled by such a co-approach is that it can offer a gracefully degrading
QoS where, even when the fault rates reach very high rates, the system could





Every time the single-fault injection tool (as described in Section 2.2) is invoked in
fault-injection mode (and not for measuring the fault-free execution time under in-
strumentation of the application-under-test): (a) it performs a bit-flip in a random (or
specified) bit at the memory location accessed by a random (or specified) load memory
access, (b) it monitors the effect on the application and (c) it reports back with a CSV
record.
The reported information are providing extensive details on the injected fault and
the corruption effects on the execution. This appendix details the format and meaning
of each value of the reported record.
When a fault was not injected successfully to a specified memoryRefNo, the
following is reported:
memoryRefNo,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
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memoryRefNo: Number of the memory load reference that the fault was injected. It
can be either specified as a tool parameter or chosen randomly by
the tool. Only memory load references to memory are counted. Just
before the desired memory load reference is encountered, the tool
injects a bit-flip to the memory address that the memory reference
reads.
IPatFault: [hex] Instruction pointer of the instruction when the fault was
injected.
opcodeAtFault: [string] Opcode of the instruction when the fault was injected.
String produced by Pin’s OPCODE StringShort().
icountAtFault: Number of total instructions executed until the fault was injected.
memAddress: [hex] Memory address of corrupted data.
size: Size of corrupted data in bytes.
testedBit: Location where the bit-flip was injected in the corrupted data. It can
be either specified as a tool parameter or chosen randomly by the
tool. The LSB is 0. The MSB is size∗8−1.
location: [char] Type of location in memory address space where the
corrupted data reside. ‘H’ for heap, ‘G’ for global or ‘S’ for stack.
Default value: ‘H’. Type of location is detected based on its memory
address. Stack is detected by Pin’s instrumentation. Global is
detected by checking if the memory address lies within the memory
space occupied by the applications currently executing image.
user: [char] User of corrupted data. ‘S’ for system libraries or ‘U’ for
user. Default value: ‘U’. Detected by checking if the memory
address lies within the memory space of an applications image that
includes /lib/ or /lib64/ in its name.
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type: [string] Type of corrupted data based on their use. At the moment
of the fault-injection (that happens just before a memory read oper-
ation), the first written register is used to determine the type of the
corrupted value. Alternative detection methods hold for the cases of
PTR, PTRMR, PTRTP and INT. Default value: INT.
FP: Floating point (if the first written register is an FP register)
IP: Instruction pointer (if the first written register is the IP
register)
FLAGS: If the first written register is eflags/rflags/flags.
SEG: If the first written register is a segment register.
PTR: If the first written register is the stack pointer, or if
the uncorrupted value is within the range [lowAddress,
highAddress] of one of the applications images (and thus
it will probably be a pointer).
PTRMR: If the corrupted value (or the uncorrupted value) is used
as an effective memory address to access memory at any
point of the execution after the fault injection.
PTRTP: If the corrupted value is used to compute a memory
address. This is done by tracking the original corrupted
register and corrupted memory locations over a specified
window of instructions. In every instruction the corruption
is propagating into other registers and memory locations
(if needed), until a corrupted register is used for computing
a memory address. Then the original corrupted value is
assumed to be used as a memory addressing value.
INT: Integer. If none of the above, then the corrupted value is
assumed to be used as an integer.
firstUseReg: [string] Register name of the first written register at the moment of
fault injection. String produced by Pin’s REG StringShort().
firstUseOpcode: [string] Opcode of the first instruction that uses the firstUseReg as
an input register, after the fault injection. Default value: UNUSED.
String produced by Pin’s OPCODE StringShort(). UNUSED when
firstUseReg was not used at all. MASKED when firstUseReg
was used as an output register without being used as an input before.
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firstUseIP: [hex] Instruction pointer of the first instruction that uses the
firstUseReg as an input register, after the fault injection. Default
value: 0x0
timeToFirstUse: Time in instructions from the fault injection until firstUseReg is
used as an input register for the first time after the fault injection.
Default value: 0
ifPtrTimeToUse: Time in instructions from the fault injection until the corrupted
value is detected as PTRTP or PTRMR. Default value: 0.
taintSpreadReg: Number of corrupted registers (due to propagation of the original
corruption) at (a) the moment the corrupted value is detected as
PTRTP or PTRMR, or (b) the monitoring window is over.1 Default
value: 0
taintSpreadMem: Number of corrupted memory bytes (due to propagation of the
original corruption) at (a) the moment the corrupted value is
detected as PTRTP or PTRMR, or (b) the monitoring window is
over.1 Default value: 0
maxTaintSpreadReg:Total number of registers corrupted (due to propagation of the
original corruption) from the moment of fault injection until (a) the
moment the corrupted value is detected as PTRTP or PTRMR, or
(b) the monitoring window is over.1 Default value: 0
maxTaintSpreadMem:Total number of corrupted memory bytes (due to propagation of the
original corruption) from the moment of fault injection until (a) the
moment the corrupted value is detected as PTRTP or PTRMR, or
(b) the monitoring window is over.1 Default value: 0
totalIcount: Total number of instructions executed until the application stopped
execution regardless of the outcome.
1Note that taintSpreadReg, taintSpreadMem, maxTaintSpreadReg, maxTaintSpreadMem are
computed only when tracking the corrupted value to check if it is used for memory addressing. Even
if the corrupted value is not detected as PTRTP, if these values are not zero, then they can still provide
an insight of how much the corruption propagated during the propagation tracking. In other words,
when these are non-zero, they provide with information regarding how much the corruption propagated
between the fault-injection moment until one of the following happened: (a) PTRMR detected, (b)
PTRTP detected, (c) monitoring window is over.
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outcome: [string] Execution outcome of experiment.
CO: COrrect output
CD: Correct output but Delayed, detected based on the total
executed instructions according to the set delayedRatio
WR: WRong output
SI: application Stall detected due to excessive executed
Instructions, according to the set unresponsiveRatioInstr
ST: application Stall detected due to excessive execution
Time, according to the set unresponsiveRatioTime
CR: application CRashed
opcodeAtCrash: [string] Opcode of last instruction executed that caused the
crash. Only valid when application crashed due to a signal. De-
fault value: “X”. String produced by Pin’s OPCODE StringShort().
crashCode: Application exit code. Only valid when application exited abnor-
mally. Default value: -1
crashSignal: Crash signal number. Only valid when application crashed due to a
signal. Default value: -1
timeToCrash: Time in instructions from the fault injection until the crash. Only
valid when the application crashed (due to a signal or abnormal
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